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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

EXAMINING THE EFFECTS OF PUBLIC POLICIES AND ADDICTION ON
PURCHASE OF TOBACCO PRODUCTS WITH CAUSAL INFERENCE AND MACHINE
LEARNING METHODS
My three essays explore the effects of tobacco policies and addiction on the consumption
of e-cigarettes and other tobacco products. Recently, jurisdictions imposed taxes and other
regulations on e-cigarettes, with the hope to raise tax revenues and address health concerns
regarding e-cigarette use, especially youth addiction. My first essay in Chapter 1 focuses on the
effects of e-cigarette taxes on sales of e-cigarettes. It compares the two types of tax policies on
sales of e-cigarettes, cigarettes, and smoking-cessation products. This comparison provides
information for lawmakers on decisions of taxes regarding the perspectives of revenue generation
and tobacco control. Second, after exploring the tax effects on sales of these tobacco products at an
aggregated level, it would be interesting to examine if the tax policy has diverse effects on different
groups of consumers of the three tobacco products. My second essay in Chapter 2 provides answers
to this question. Since most e-cigarettes contain nicotine, my third essay in Chapter 3 tests if ecigarettes are addictive from the perspective of economics. The results provide policy implications
for future regulations of e-cigarette use.
The first essay investigates the effects of two types of e-cigarette tax policies on sales of ecigarettes using time-series cross-sectional weekly purchases from Nielsen Retail Scanner Data
between 2011 and 2017. The first type of taxes is ad valorem taxes, which tax e-cigarettes on a
percentage of the wholesale or retail price. The second type of tax is specific excise taxes, which
collect taxes according to tax rates per milliliter (ml) of the consumable liquid. With a generalized
synthetic control (GSC) identification strategy, my first essay measures the average tax effects of
multiple treated regions in various treated periods against the untreated control regions and the
untreated periods. The results show an estimate of -3.567 for the own-price elasticity of e-cigarette
demand and an estimate of 0.433 for the pass-through rate of e-cigarette taxes to price in all treated
regions.
With these estimates, one can infer the tax revenues generated and the sales effects of the
two types of tax policies. The inference indicates that ad valorem taxes are more effective on
tobacco control. In comparison, the specific volumetric excise taxes are more for tax revenue
generation. Additionally, the ad valorem taxes show larger average effects but smaller marginal
effects than the specific volumetric excise taxes. The results in this essay also indicate that
cigarettes and SCP are economic substitutes for e-cigarettes; however, increasing e-cigarette taxes
would not raise sales of cigarettes but would increase sales of SCP, when the tax-to-price ratio of
e-cigarettes is below or similar to that of cigarettes after tax increases.

The second essay examines the policy responses of different groups of consumers of the
three tobacco products with the Nielsen Consumer Panel Data between 2012 and 2018. This essay
identifies seven groups of consumers according to the data. Some of them consume exclusively on
one product while others consume two products or all three products in the meantime. With a
generalized difference-in-differences identification strategy, results do not find that ad valorem
taxes bring health concerns to any of the seven investigated subgroups of purchasers. In
comparison, specific excise taxes increase e-cigarette purchases by subgroups of e-cigarette
purchasers except for triple purchasers of the three products. Additionally, the average results for
all these groups are that e-cigarette taxes decrease their SCP purchases but do not influence
cigarette purchases. Comparing the effects of two types of e-cigarette taxes, though both negatively
influence purchases of SCP, specific excise taxes increase purchases of cigarettes and e-cigarettes
while ad valorem taxes do not have such effects.
The third essay examines the role of addiction in influencing the demand for e-cigarettes
using the Nielsen Retail Scanner Data between 2012 and 2017. With a comparison of a myopic
addiction model, a forward-looking model, and a rational addiction model, this essay tests whether
consumption of e-cigarettes is addictive and rational. Results provide evidence that consumers are
rationally addicted to e-cigarettes. The long-run price elasticity estimates are larger than the
estimates of the short-run price elasticity. Estimates of both long-run and short-run elasticities are
greater than one, -1.50 and -1.05, indicating e-cigarette demand is elastic in both the long-run and
short-run. Additionally, the data show evidence that e-cigarettes are less addictive than cigarettes
on average because the addictiveness coefficient estimate for e-cigarettes is smaller.
These three essays aim to provide insights to policymakers on the effectiveness of tax
policies regarding revenue generations and tobacco control. The general findings of the three essays
are e-cigarette taxes influence purchases, consumers are rationally addicted to the product but they
respond differently to the tax policy. Different responses of the seven groups of consumers provide
information for lawmakers to weigh the cons and pros of the two types of policies regarding which
groups are the policies mainly targeted for tobacco control. Moreover, addiction could influence
tax effects. In the long run, e-cigarette taxes have larger cumulative effects on tobacco control than
in the short run. Findings from these essays provide evidence to facilitate future regulations on ecigarettes. Additionally, they also contribute the literature on applying methods of causal inference
and machine learning in exploring e-cigarettes policy regulations.
KEYWORDS: E-Cigarettes, Cigarettes, Excise Tax, Addiction, Policy, Causal Inference
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CHAPTER 1. ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF E-CIGARETTE
GENERALIZED SYNTHETIC CONTROL APPROACH
1.1

TAXES:

A

Introduction
Many U.S. states and local governments have begun taxing e-cigarette manufacturers or retailers

since 2013. By the end of 2017, eight jurisdictions taxed e-cigarettes including California, Kansas,
Louisiana, Minnesota, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia. Some
local governments in the remaining states, such as Alaska, Illinois, and Maryland, also began taxing ecigarettes. As a result, the number of states that taxed e-cigarette taxes quickly expanded to nineteen by
February 2020. Similar to cigarette taxes, tax revenues generated from e-cigarette taxes can fund activities
such as health research, anti-smoking campaigns, and preschool education (Fiore et al., 2004, Marr and
Huang, 2014).
Understanding the effects of e-cigarette taxes on the price and purchase of e-cigarettes and those
of related tobacco products provides essential information for governments to regulate them. A myriad of
studies has investigated how tobacco product taxes influence their own and related tobacco product sales
(Evans et al., 1999, Wasserman et al., 1991) and recommend tax as an effective strategy to control tobacco
product consumption. Most of them are on cigarettes. For example, Amato et al. (2015) provides evidence
that a $1.75 increase of cigarette tax in Minnesota reduced the number of packs purchased by 12.1%.
Ohsfeldt et al. (1997) show that cigarette excise taxes are associated with an increased probability of using
smokeless tobacco products.
As to e-cigarettes, several researchers have examined their price elasticities and find them to be
elastic, including Huang et al. (2014) and Zheng et al. (2017). Increasing attention has been paid to the
impacts of e-cigarette taxes, such as those on prenatal smoking (Abouk et al., 2019), teenage smoking
(Pesko and Warman, 2017), and adult smoking (Saffer et al., 2020). Amato and Boyle (2016) conduct the
very first research on how taxes affect e-cigarette sales, showing mixed results of a tax increase in
Minnesota. In the post-tax periods, their results show that a short-period spike has occurred in e-cigarette
sales purchased from convenience stores before a sales decline; a decrease of cigarette sales has co-occurred
with an e-cigarette sales increase. Note that they evaluate the consumption trends graphically and thus do
not address the causal impact of the taxes.
There is a critical need in analyzing the magnitudes of e-cigarette tax effects on sales and prices
using causal inference methods. Several recent studies tackle this issue using the differences-in-differences
(DID) method such as Saffer et al. (2020) and Cotti et al., (2020), at the state and national levels
respectively. In contrast, I employ a generalized synthetic control (GSC) approach to investigate the effects
of e-cigarette taxes in multiple treated regions on sales quantities, prices, and revenues of e-cigarettes,
cigarettes, and smoking cessation products (SCP). This method, developed by Xu (2017), relaxes the often-
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violated parallel-trend assumption and expands the regular synthetic control approach to multiple treatment
units at various treatment periods (in my case, multiple states and local jurisdictions started taxing ecigarettes at various points). It has been recently adopted by many researchers in the fields of marketing,
political science, economics, etc. I aim to provide the first attempt to apply this approach to the research of
tobacco tax. I obtain an estimate of -3.567 for the own-price elasticity of e-cigarettes and an estimate of
43.3% for the average pass-through of e-cigarette taxes to price in all treated regions. Similarly, I obtain
the corresponding estimates for cigarettes at -0.629 and 101.5%, respectively.
I further investigate the heterogeneities of e-cigarette tax effects by examining whether these taxes
differ by how they are imposed. Currently, e-cigarette taxes are mainly implemented in two types: ad
valorem taxes on a percentage of the wholesale or retail price and specific volumetric excise taxes on
milliliters of the liquid. These two types of tax collections could reflect different underlying motivations:
tax revenue generation or tobacco control (World Health Organization, 2010). I use the GSC regressions as
the main results to identify the average overall effects of each type of e-cigarette tax. My results show that
the two types of e-cigarette taxes realize their corresponding underlying policy motivations.
Moreover, I display two ways for conversions of e-cigarette taxes into one comparable
measurement. The first conversion uses calculations of the wholesale price. The second conversion uses
tax rates for e-cigarettes and cigarettes in the District of Columbia (DC) as e-cigarette taxes are matched
100% to cigarette excise taxes at the municipal level in DC. The second conversion is not new in existing
working papers as those by Cotti et al., (2020) and Allcott and Rafkin (2020); however, I improve this
conversion by adjusting the changes over time. Though I reach similar results from these two completely
different conversions, my results use the first conversion as a lower bound. This conversion provides a valid
tool for future research regarding wholesale price calculations as supported by data.
To my knowledge, I am among the first few to evaluate the causal effects of e-cigarette taxes. My
research shares a similar overall objective with two concurrently conducted studies but employs a different
empirical method. Allcott and Rafkin (2020) explore the relationship between e-cigarette taxes and prices
in an instrumental variable (IV) model and estimate the price elasticity of demand for use in welfare
calculations. Cotti et al., (2020) use a standard two-way fixed effects model (DID) mostly to measure the
pass-through rate of e-cigarette taxes. In comparison, using both the above methods as comparisons to my
main results, I rely on the GSC strategy to investigate the heterogeneity of e-cigarette taxes, without the
need to assume taxes impact sales only via price or a parallel trend assumption as in the IV and DID
methods. I also show the dynamics of the tax effects over time, complementing other existing research on
this aspect.
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1.2

E-Cigarette Taxing Approach
Regions implemented the two tax policies (ad valorem and specific excise taxes) likely under

different backgrounds and motivations. Regions seem to impose a specific e-cigarette excise tax with the
main goal of raising revenues, which was initially proposed and lobbied by tobacco companies to reduce
losses from declining sales of traditional cigarettes. In comparison, regions could have used ad valorem
taxes on e-cigarettes to control the consumption of tobacco products. These differences, combined with the
different imposition mechanisms, sizes, and pass-through rates of the taxes, could lead to tax heterogeneous
effects. This section introduces the laws, motivations, and backgrounds of regions implementing these two
types of taxes in the order of effective policy dates.
The first state-level e-cigarette tax was enacted in 2010 when Minnesota (MN) combated the
prevalence and consumption of tobacco products through the conduction of mass media campaigns on a
statewide tobacco control program (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2019a). This program
included a comprehensive statewide smoking ban, tobacco tax increases in 2005 and 2013, and local
outdoor smoke-free laws. With this context, MN updated the definition of tobacco products so that ecigarettes were subject to excise taxes and other tobacco control regulations, including restrictions on the
minimum age to purchase the product. In this update, MN taxed all non-cigarette tobacco products at a
percentage of the wholesale price at which distributors purchased a tobacco product. In July 2013, MN
increased excise taxes for both cigarettes and non-cigarette tobacco products (including e-cigarettes). The
tax rate of e-cigarettes increased to 95% of the wholesale price.
The second state to impose an e-cigarette tax was North Carolina (NC). In June 2015, NC levied a
tax of $0.05 on each milliliter of the nicotine liquid that e-cigarettes use. At this time, sales of e-cigarettes
had grown dramatically while the market was largely unregulated. Large tobacco companies including NC
based Reynolds American Inc, supported this tax as they sought to replace the declining market for
traditional cigarettes. This tax helped NC, which had begun to lose tax revenues as people switched from
traditional to electronic cigarettes, by generating around $2 and $5 million in the first two years. Revenues
would be lower if NC taxed e-cigarettes as traditional cigarettes or as other tobacco products. Since 2009,
NC has taxed cigarettes at $0.45 per pack, currently ranked 47th in the U.S.; and other tobacco products are
taxed at 12.8% of the wholesale price, according to data from the American Lung Association (2020a and
2020b) and the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids (2020a and 2020b).
As the market of e-cigarettes grows and the consumption of traditional cigarettes declines, more
jurisdictions have imposed e-cigarette taxes, weighing revenue, public health, and other considerations.
They mainly have followed the examples of MN and NC. As of February 2020, 19 states and the District
of Columbia 1 imposed e-cigarette taxes (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2020). Aside from
1

Among them, nine jurisdictions employed the MN approach: Minnesota, District of Columbia,
Pennsylvania, California, Illinois, New York, Vermont, Nevada, and Massachusetts; eight
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these jurisdictions, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, and local areas in Maryland, Illinois, and Alaska also
tax e-cigarettes. At the federal level, the government is considering imposing an excise tax amounting to
$50.33 per 1,810 mg, equivalent to the $1.01 federal levy per pack of cigarettes.

1.3

Data
My policy analysis utilizes two parts of data: policy data and sales data. The policy data is obtained

from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s State Tobacco Activities Tracking and Evaluation
(STATE) System (2019b), government websites, and consultations with designated officials for state and
local jurisdictions. The policy focus of this article is e-cigarette taxes. Meanwhile, I control for changes in
four other related policies at the state level. These policies include changes in cigarette excise taxes, the
requirement of licensures for over-the-counter sale of e-cigarettes, Smokefree Air Laws (SFA) that restrict
the use of e-cigarettes indoors, and regulations prohibiting sales of e-cigarettes to minors. The age
restrictions were 18 for most states, and up to age 19 or 21 for a few states. Among these five types of
policy changes, changes in cigarette excise taxes are denoted in the dollar amounts adjusted to the level of
December 2017, all other policies are measured as indicator variables in my primary GSC analyses.
Table A2.a shows the amounts of taxes (with the effective starting date) in regions with e-cigarette
taxes by the end of 2017. Seven states and DC imposed e-cigarette taxes at the state level. At the local level,
the City of Chicago (C1) and Cook County in Illinois (C2), as well as Montgomery County in Maryland
(M1), had e-cigarette taxes effective at different dates. I treat each of them as a distinct region for this
reason. They comprise 11 treated regions with e-cigarette taxes during the investigation time interval. The
two-letter region abbreviations representing them are C1, C2, CA, DC, KS, LA, M1, MN, NC, PA, and
WV. Alaska, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, and Hawaii are excluded from this study because purchase
data for these regions are not available in my data source. The other 41 no-tax regions thus serve as the
controls for the treatment. In total, I have 52 regions over 330 weeks spanning from September 12, 2011,
through December 30, 2017. 2 This makes the total number of region-week combinations 17,160.
Further, I construct two groups for the 11 treated regions based on how they tax e-cigarettes. I
denote specific excise taxes on e-cigarettes according to liquid volume in milliliters (mls) as volumetric
taxes (V.Tax), used in CA, DC, M1, MN, and PA. I use price taxes (P.Tax) to refer to ad valorem taxes on
e-cigarettes by percentages of the wholesale or retail price, used in the remaining six regions. I first analyze
the effects of e-cigarette taxes in all the treated regions and then compare effects from the two different
types of taxes to evaluate the heterogeneity of the tax effects across these two treated groups. During my

states applied the NC method: NC, LA, KS, West Virginia, Delaware, Ohio, Washington, and
Wisconsin; three states used a hybrid of the MN approach and the NC method: Connecticut,
New Jersey, and New Mexico.
2

I started the time span at this week because many regions did not sell e-cigarettes until this date.
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chosen time interval, 40 changes happened in cigarette excise taxes, ranging from $-0.10 to $2.50, at the
nominal level.
The data source of product purchases is the Nielsen Retail Scanner Data. It provides the weekly
units purchased, price, and total paid dollar amounts for each product (Universal Product Code [UPC]) at
participating stores, from a variety of outlets, such as convenience stores, drug stores, and mass
merchandisers. I focus on analyzing sales quantities, prices, and revenues of three product categories: ecigarettes, cigarettes, and SCP. E-cigarette sales include disposable e-cigarettes, cartridge refills, and starter
kits. Cigarette sales include all brands available. SCP sales include patches, gums, lozenges, etc. I organize
the purchase data to the region-week level for e-cigarettes in units, e-cigarettes in milliliters (mls), cigarettes
in packs, and SCP in units. Each aggregated quantity observation in units for e-cigarettes and SCP
represents the total number of the smallest units purchased for all UPCs at a particular region in a week. I
also match 93.5% of the e-cigarette products by the value of sales, in units, in the Nielsen dataset to ecigarette characteristics,3 including the mls of liquid in each e-cigarette UPC. Furthermore, I aggregate
weekly total sales revenues for all UPCs in a particular region. With the sales quantities and revenues, I
then construct a sales-weighted average price for each product category in a region-week combination.
Finally, using the available sales quantities and prices of e-cigarettes measured in mls, I convert
P.Tax to dollar amounts per ml. This will unify the two types of taxes into one standard. I use two methods
for completing this process. These two methods are completely different but reach similar results,
suggesting either of them can be used as a valid approximation of the real taxes collected. The first method
uses the average retail price per ml in a region-week combination to compute the pre-tax wholesale price,
based on guidelines of cigarette minimum price laws (Department of Taxation and Finance in New York
State, 2020). I assume that the markups are similar for e-cigarettes, and then multiply the computed pre-tax
wholesale price with the tax rate in the corresponding region-week observation to get the tax rate for each
ml.
The second method uses DC’s tax to compute the dollar amounts for each percentage point of P.Tax
since the e-cigarette tax rate in DC matches 100% of the cigarette excise tax. Then, based on this value, I
calculate total tax revenues and the tax rate for each ml (see appendix for further details).

1.4
1.4.1

Empirical Strategy
Selection of the Generalized Synthetic Control (GSC) Approach
The GSC method has been recently employed in many fields of social sciences, including

marketing, economics, political science, etc. I have selected the GSC approach because it requires fewer
3

These e-cigarette characteristics are used in Cotti et al., (2018) and Cotti et al., (2020). I acknowledge
their generosity for sharing the data.

5

assumptions and allows me to estimate the average treatment effect for multiple treatment units at various
treatment periods. In comparison, DID is one of the most commonly used causal inference strategies for
panel data. Its underlying assumption is “parallel trends”: in the absence of the treatment, the average
outcomes of the treated and control units are supposed to follow parallel paths. Due to the presence of
unobserved, time-varying confounders, however, data do not support the pre-treatment trends in many
cases, resulting in the violation of the parallel trends assumption. In my case, I have generated trends of ecigarette sales quantities and prices respectively in treated regions and control regions. Figures show that
the pre-treatment trends for DID are not exactly parallel (will provide upon request).
Two broadly used approaches can address this potential assumption violation, but with certain
limitations. One approach, conditioning the pre-treatment observables, uses matching methods to balance
the influence of time-varying confounders between the treated and control groups. For example, the
synthetic control method, proposed by Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (Abadie et al., 2015, 2010),
matches both the pre-treatment covariates and outcomes between a treated unit and its control units in the
pre-treatment periods. The method constructs a synthetic control group as the counterfactual for the treated
unit by reweighting the control units. Then, it uses the post-treatment pattern of this synthetic control as the
counterfactual prediction for the treated unit. However, the limitations of the synthetic control method are
that it only applies to one treated unit and its uncertainty estimates are not easy to interpret.
The other approach explicitly models the unobserved, time-varying confounders, such as adding
unit-specific linear or quadratic time trends to two-way fixed effects models. However, this method
consumes a large number of degrees of freedom and yet may not solve the problem if the underlying
confounders are not in the form of the specified trends. Another way models the unobserved, time-varying
confounders semi-parametrically. For example, Bai (2009) proposes an interactive fixed effects (IFE)
model by incorporating unit-specific intercepts with time-varying coefficients. This method interactively
estimates the IFE model in a factor analysis of residuals. In the analysis of the IFE model, (latent) factors
refer to unit-specific intercepts and factor loadings denote time-varying coefficients.
The GSC relaxes the often-violated parallel trend assumption and generalizes the synthetic control
method from a single treated unit and a single treatment period. It allows me to estimate the average
treatment effect for multiple treatment units at various treatment periods by unifying the synthetic control
method with linear fixed-effects models. In my case, I have 11 treated regions with e-cigarette tax policies,
and each has a different policy effective date during my investigation time interval.
Using the GSC strategy has three additional advantages for my estimations. First, the algorithm of
the GSC is fast and less sensitive to idiosyncrasies of a small number of observations, because it estimates
the IFE model only once and obtains the treated counterfactuals in a single run. Second, the GSC method
provides frequentist uncertainty estimates, including standard errors and confidence intervals; using all
observations from the control group, it also improves the efficiency of the synthetic control method. Third,
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this procedure avoids multiple robustness tests for model specifications, because the algorithm utilizes a
cross-validation procedure in machine learning to automatically select the optimal number of factors in the
IFE model, reducing the risks of overfitting.
1.4.2

Econometric Model
The functional form of my estimations using the GSC approach is:
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑖𝑡 𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑡 𝛽 + 𝜆′𝑖 𝑓𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1),
where 𝐷𝑖𝑡 equals 1 if region 𝑖 at week 𝑡 has been exposed to e-cigarette taxes, otherwise, it equals

0; 𝛿𝑖𝑡 represents the heterogeneous treatment effect in region 𝑖 at week 𝑡; 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of the four other,
observable control policy covariates; 𝛽 is a vector of unknown parameters, representing constant mean
effects of each control policy over time; 𝑓𝑡 is a vector of unobserved, common factors; 𝜆𝑖 is a vector of
unknown factor loadings; 𝜀𝑖𝑡 has zero mean and denotes the unobserved, idiosyncratic disturbances for
region 𝑖 at week 𝑡.
Therefore, my identification comes from the various changes of e-cigarette taxes across different
regions over time. In the estimation, taking the average of 𝛿𝑖𝑡 reaches the average treatment effect for all
treated regions, across all treated weeks. I use this equation to investigate the average treatment effects of
all treated regions and examine heterogeneous treatment effects across regions with the two different types
of taxes.
In each of the regressions on sales quantities, 𝑌𝑖𝑡 represents a different outcome variable, including
the log of the total e-cigarettes sold in units (in region 𝑖 at week 𝑡), the log of the total e-cigarettes sold in
mls, the log of the total cigarettes sold in packs, and the log of the total SCP sold in units. In the regressions
on sales prices and revenues, 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is defined similarly with prices and revenues replacing quantities,
respectively. Box-cox tests support the transformation in logs. Also, I have normalized all variables in the
GSC estimations to speed up the process of cross-validation, without making assumptions about the
distribution of the data.
The framework above can directly incorporate additive, two-way fixed effects, known time trends,
and exogenous time-invariant covariates. In the function above, the factor component, 𝜆′𝑖 𝑓𝑡 , takes a linear
additive form. This component covers various, unobserved heterogeneities, including the conventional
additive region and week fixed effects, region-specific linear or quadratic time trends, and autoregressive
components. In sum, this component captures all unobserved random confounders, as long as these
confounders can be decomposed into a multiplicative form absorbed by 𝜆′𝑖 𝑓𝑡 ; however, it cannot cover
unobserved variables that are independent across regions. I include both region and week fixed-effects
directly in my estimations.
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In addition, to compare the results reached from the GSC regressions using indicators of e-cigarette
changes, I used the continuous changes of e-cigarette taxes with the DID identification strategy. I expect
the magnitudes of the e-cigarette tax effects from these DID regressions are smaller than those obtained in
the GSC estimations as shown by Xu (2017).
Specifically, I estimate:
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑡 𝛽 + 𝑟𝑖 + 𝑤𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡 (2),
where 𝐸𝑖𝑡 equals e-cigarette tax changes in dollar amounts per ml, 𝛼 provides an estimate of the
marginal treatment effect of e-cigarette tax changes at the average, 𝑟𝑖 denotes region fixed effects,
𝑤𝑡 represents week fixed effects, and 𝜈𝑖𝑡 signifies standard errors clustered at the state level.
Lastly, to address the potential concern of price endogeneity, I instrumented e-cigarette prices and
cigarette prices with changes of e-cigarette taxes and cigarette taxes respectively in instrumental variable
(IV) regressions of sales quantities. Compared to the main results from GSC estimations, these IV
estimations pose a strong assumption that taxes influence sales quantities solely by influencing prices.

1.5

Results
This section first shows the average treatment effects of the treated regions using both the GSC and

DID approaches. Next, I have explored the heterogeneity of the tax effects and calculated pass-through
rates for e-cigarette taxes and various related price elasticities.
1.5.1

Summary Statistics
Before any regression analysis, I have conducted comparisons of summary statistics in Table 1.1

for the treated and the control groups, as well as the pre-treatment and the post-treatment periods for the
treated regions. As to translating P.Tax into dollar amounts per ml, both conversions reach similar results
(see details in Appendix 1). With the first conversion (conversion [a]), the average P.Tax per ml is $4.4,
which is much larger than the average of $0.5 for V.Tax. The average e-cigarette tax increase per ml in all
the treated regions is $2.6.
For the treated regions, all policy variables have higher values in the post-treatment period
(treatment-tax), i.e. these e-cigarette and cigarette policies are stricter than those in the pre-treatment weeks.
This highlights the importance of controlling for these policies to identify the effects of e-cigarette taxes.
Table 1.1 also indicates that sales quantities and prices of both e-cigarettes and cigarettes are respectively
lower and higher in the post-treatment period.
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1.5.2

Average Treatment Effects on the Treated (ATT) for E-Cigarette Sales
Figure 1.1 shows the treatment status by week for all the 52 regions in my investigation period. 4

Each rectangular unit represents a region-week combination. It visualizes the length of the treatment time
for each treated region and displays the various effective dates for e-cigarette tax policies, which provides
excellent sources for the identification.
The GSC regressions estimate the effect of the e-cigarette tax (EET) in the post-treatment period
by subtracting the time intercepts estimated from the control group and region intercepts obtained from the
pre-treatment data of the treated. The predicted sales of e-cigarettes for region i at week t is the sum of
region intercept i and week intercept t, plus the impact of the time-varying covariates if included. In the
first eight columns of Table 1.2, I present the DID and GSC results (ATT) for e-cigarettes quantities
measured by units and mls, respectively. All regressions in Table 1.2 included region and week fixedeffects. Standard errors are all generated by parametric bootstraps of 1,000 times. Based on the unit
measure, I have found that the GSC estimate is much larger. Specifically, the estimated ATT of EET by
DID is -35.1% and that is -63.5% by the GSC when all the controls are included. This suggests that potential
violations of the “parallel trends” assumption, contrast to Figure 1.2, attenuate the estimates of the DID.
Both specifications fail to report a statistically significant impact of EET when mls are used.
The top panel in Figure 1.2 visualizes the GSC results in column (4) of Table 1.2. In the left panel,
the solid line shows the average actual sales of e-cigarettes in units, and the dashed line represents the
counterfactual synthetic control—the average predicted sales in the absence of EET. Similar to figures
generated in an event study for the DID, the GSC method generates the actual and the predicted average
sales before and after EET took effect in all the treated regions. The two lines in the top left figure are
almost coincident before EET took effect. The top right figure shows the gap between the solid and dashed
lines in the left figure, with grey, shaded areas denoting the 95% confidence intervals. The EET effect
peaked at the 175th week in the post-treatment period and declined in the weeks after. Based on the same
specification, I have found that a one-dollar cigarette tax increase raised the average e-cigarette unit sales
by 7.8%. This signifies a substitutive relationship among sales of e-cigarettes and cigarettes.
The GSC regressions estimate the effect of the e-cigarette tax (EET) in the post-treatment period
by subtracting the time intercepts estimated from the control group and region intercepts obtained from the
pre-treatment data of the treated. The predicted sales of e-cigarettes for region 𝑖 at week 𝑡 is the sum of
region intercept 𝑖 and week intercept 𝑡, plus the impact of the time-varying covariates if included. In the
first eight columns of Table 1.2, I present the DID and GSC results (ATT) for e-cigarettes quantities

4

Due to missing sales data before 2011 in most regions as controls for the first e-cigarette tax change
in Minnesota, I analyze tax effects in Minnesota starting at its second e-cigarette tax increase
in all the GSC regressions.
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measured by units and mls, respectively. 5 All regressions in Table 1.2 included region and week fixedeffects. Standard errors are all generated by parametric bootstraps of 1,0006 times. Based on the unit
measure, I have found that the GSC estimate is much larger. Specifically, the estimated ATT of EET by the
DID is -35.1% and that is -63.5% by the GSC when all the controls are included. This suggests that potential
violations of the “parallel trends” assumption, contrast to Figure 1.2, attenuate the estimates of the DID.
Both specifications fail to report a statistically significant impact of EET when mls are used.
In columns (9) to (12), I have investigated the heterogeneous tax effects by tax type using the GSC
approach. I have found that for the unit measure, the tax impact for P.Tax is -1.01 and statistically significant
(at the 5% default level) while that impact of V.Tax is not statistically significant.
1.5.3

Average Treatment Effects on the Treated for E-Cigarette Prices and Revenues
In Table 1.3, I apply the GSC specification in column (4) of Table 1.2 to e-cigarette prices and

revenue. The variables logP(unit) and LogP(ml) represent logs of the weekly average price for all e-cigarette
products per unit and per ml in each region, respectively. Each dependent variable contains three
regressions, for different treated regions: P.Tax regions, V.Tax regions, and all treated regions.
In the first group, column (3) of Table 1.3 shows that the overall ATT is a 17.8% increase in ecigarette prices for all treated regions in the post-treatment period when compared with the control. Similar
to the results in Table 1.2, column (1) indicates that P.Tax has a larger effect than does V.Tax (0.305 vs.
0.046). The bottom panel of Figure 1.2 presents the counterfactual for the average of all treated regions and
the ATT over time. The counterfactual indicates that the average price of e-cigarettes had been declining
but the taxes reversed this declining trend. Similar to Figure 2, I show the tax effects on prices and quantities
in a series of figures, Figure A2.a to Figure A2.k in Appendix 2, for each individual treated region.
The bottom panel in Figure 1.3 shows the estimated factors and factor loadings obtained in the
results of column (3). The first factor captures the price decrease over time. The second factor shows the
price fluctuates before the 150th week7, then decreases throughout the remaining weeks. Tracking back to
Figure 1.3 (b), I find that the second factor also negatively influences the sales quantities after the 150 th
week. Such unobserved factors could reflect public/regulatory perception of e-cigarettes from an alternative
to smoking cessation to a tobacco product with associated risks.
In the last group of regressions for revenues, results show that EET reduces the weekly average
sales revenues of e-cigarettes by 39.2%. P.Tax again shows a much stronger effect. In comparison, sales
revenues in the V.Tax regions increase by 4.6%, on average, in the post-treatment period.
5

Adjusting sales quantities by population, I reached very similar results in all the regressions.

6

Increasing the number of bootstrap times to 5,000 or greater yielded similar results.

7

The 150th week dates between July 7 and July 13, 2014.
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1.5.4

Impacts on Quantities, Prices, and Revenues of Cigarettes and SCP
In Table 1.4, I investigate if EET influences sales quantities, prices, and sales revenues of cigarettes

and SCP, which are closely related products to e-cigarettes. In panel A, I have found that cigarette taxes
play an important role in influencing cigarette sales quantities (in packs), revenues, and prices. EET
increases the weekly average price for cigarettes by 2% but does not show heterogeneities among different
treated regions. In comparison, increasing cigarette taxes by one dollar increases the average cigarette price
by 14%. In panel B, EET increases SCP quantities and prices, and such impacts are driven by the ad valorem
taxes. This suggests that e-cigarettes and SCP are substitutes as well.
1.5.5

Price Elasticities of Demand and Tax Pass-Through Rates
I have calculated price elasticities using statistically significant coefficients (GSC specification) in

the result tables. For example, for the own-price elasticity of demand for e-cigarettes, I divide the tax effect
on quantities (-0.635 in column [4] of Table 1.2) by the tax effect on the corresponding price (0.178 in
column [3] of Table 1.3) according to the chain rule, yielding an elasticity of -3.567 in all treated regions.
The magnitude of this estimate is larger than those estimates in the literature with different identification
strategies. For examples, Zheng et al. (2017) obtain an estimate of -2.1; Pesko et al. (2018) reach an estimate
of -1.8. The estimate is -3.311 in the P.Tax regions, where the average price of e-cigarettes in the pre-tax
weeks are smaller than that in all treated regions.
Similarly, I obtain an own-price elasticity of cigarette demand at -0.629, which is consistent with
the consensus estimate from the literature by (the International Agency for Research on Cancer, 2011).
Also, the cross-price elasticity of cigarette prices on e-cigarette demand is 0.557, and the cross-price
elasticity of e-cigarette prices on SCP demand is 0.360. Such results imply that cigarettes and SCP are
economic substitutes for e-cigarettes.
I also have calculated the pass-through rates for e-cigarette taxes to the price of the product with
the results of column (3) in Table 1.3. I have found a $1.127 increase in price after the implementation of
EET. 8 Translating into tax increases by ml, I have reached a pass-through rate of 43.3%.9 That is, the burden
of EET is split between the consumption and production sides of the market, though consumers bear slightly
less of the burden. I have found a pass-through rate of 42.1%10 in the P.Tax regions and a pass-through rate
of 64.9%11 in the V.Tax regions.

8

0.178 * $6.332(the average price of e-cigarettes per unit in the pre-tax period).

9

[$1.127/$2.605(the average tax per ml)] *100%.

10

(0.305*6.031/4.374) *100%

11

(0.046*6.537/0.463) *100%

11

Similarly, I have calculated the pass-through rate for cigarette excise taxes to the prices of cigarettes
with the results of column (6) in Table 1.4. I have reached a pass-through rate of 101.5%. My pass-through
estimates for cigarette taxes are consistent with the estimates from the literature by Keeler et al. (1996),
Hanson and Sullivan (2009), and DeCicca et al. (2013).
1.5.6

Comparisons with the Results from the Tax Level Per ml
To compare with the results from the GSC estimates, I have conducted similar regressions using

the DID method and reported results in Table 1.5. Investigating the EET effect by tax per ml directly, I
have replaced the EET represented by the tax indicator with that of the tax level per ml in the DID
regressions. Results of EET in the V.Tax regions are statistically significant for both the price and sales
quantity regressions. I have found an own-price elasticity of e-cigarette demand at -1.35612 where quantities
are in units. Similarly, I have arrived at an elasticity estimate of -1.18313 where quantities are in ml. These
estimates are both smaller than the estimate of -3.567 from the GSC regressions.
As to price, EET increases the average price of e-cigarettes per unit by 3.6%, represented in column
(6); it increases the average price of e-cigarettes per ml by 4.8%, as shown in column (12). I have obtained
the pass-through rates of EET to e-cigarette prices per unit and per ml at 22.8% and 51.3%, respectively.
Regarding heterogeneities of tax effects, I have obtained pass-through rates on the average e-cigarette price
per unit at 19.3% in the P.Tax regions and 77.1% in the V.Tax regions. Likewise, the pass-through rates on
the average e-cigarette price per ml are 47.7% in the P.Tax regions and 117.5% in the V.Tax regions.
Consistent with my findings in the GSC models, these results show that pass-through rates are larger in the
V.Tax regions, where the tax rates are lower. Also, these DID regressions show that pass-through rates are
higher for e-cigarette prices measured in ml than in units. Note that not all e-cigarette units, unlike the
liquid, were taxed in the treated regions.
To further compare with the GSC estimates, I have applied EET and cigarette excise taxes as
instrumental variables (IV) for the corresponding prices of the products in demand estimations, using the
fixed-effects method. The first and second rows of Table 1.6 provide estimates of own-price elasticities and
cross-price elasticities, as both prices and sales quantities are in logs. As shown in the table, the estimates
of own-price elasticity of e-cigarette demand ranged between -0.179 to -1.286 in columns (1) to (6); the
magnitudes of these are smaller than the estimate in the GSC regressions. The estimates for the own-price
elasticity of cigarette demand ranged between -0.955 to -1.072; the magnitudes of these are larger than
those estimated in the GSC regressions. These IV regressions support the findings of my main results from
the GSC models, though with different magnitudes for similar estimates.

12

-0.160/0.118 (in column of (2) and (5) of Table 1.5)

13

-0.136/0.115 (in columns of (8) and (11) of Table 1.5)
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Similar results are shown for alcohol control policies by Sharma et al. (2014), as they indicate that
volumetric taxation is less effective than a price policy instrument when comparing volumetric taxation
with minimum unit pricing on the consumption of alcohol.

1.6

Conclusions
In this article, I have estimated the effects of e-cigarette taxes on sales quantities, prices, and

revenues of e-cigarettes, cigarettes, and SCP respectively. I have used the weekly Nielsen Retail Scanner
Data for purchases of these products from various stores in the U.S. My article is the first to apply the GSC
strategy to tobacco control and estimations of tax effects. Such estimates are more accurate when the
assumption of “parallel trends” is violated.
In my main results regarding all treated regions, I find that e-cigarettes are price-elastic, and
cigarettes and SCP are economic substitutes for e-cigarettes. As for pass-through, I reach an estimate of
43.3 for EET% and 101.5% for cigarette excise taxes, averaged in all treated regions. Meanwhile, I observe
the heterogeneities of tax effects. Estimates of EET on sales quantities and prices of e-cigarettes have larger
average effects in the P.Tax regions but smaller effects in the V.Tax regions, when the tax is measured as
indicators of different tax types. In contrast, when taxes are measured as dollars per ml, estimates of EET
on sales and prices of e-cigarettes have smaller marginal effects in the P.Tax regions, but larger marginal
effects in the V.Tax regions. As to heterogeneities in estimates of elasticities, my results show larger
magnitudes for estimates of own-price elasticities of e-cigarette demand when the average price of the
product is smaller. Regarding estimates of pass-through, my results demonstrate that pass-through rates for
EET are larger in the V.Tax regions, where the average tax rate is lower. Moreover, pass-through rates are
higher for e-cigarettes measured in mls than in units.
These heterogeneities show that the effects of P.Tax and V.Tax are different. These two types of
taxes are reflections of two different underlying policy motivations: tobacco control or tax revenue
generation. The average effects of these two different taxes are that sales quantities and sales revenues of
e-cigarettes decrease in the P.Tax regions. In contrast, the average sales revenues of e-cigarettes increase
in the V.Tax regions but EET does not show statistically significant results on sales revenues of cigarettes
in my main results. This indicates that these two different types of tax policies reach their corresponding
policy objectives.
Results from my DID regressions show that the marginal tax effects of each additional dollar
increase in P.Tax increase sales quantities and sales revenues of cigarettes, but the average effects of P.Tax
do not increase sales quantities nor sales revenues of cigarettes. In contrast, I observe that each additional
dollar increase in V.Tax affects neither sales quantities nor sales revenues of cigarettes but increases sales
quantities of SCP. This is to say, raising tax rates in the V.Tax regions or control regions would better
achieve the objective of tobacco control if the major policy motivation were tobacco control. At the same
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time, raising tax rates in the P.Tax regions would still contribute to the objective of tobacco control as far
as the overall tax to price ratio for e-cigarettes is lower than or similar to that for cigarettes. As my analyses
indicated, the average tax-to-price ratio at the state/region level for e-cigarettes is smaller than that of
cigarettes in the V.Tax regions, with 5% and 24% respectively. In contrast, the average ratios are 36.8%
and 35.1% for e-cigarettes and cigarettes respectively in the P.Tax regions. However, additional federal
level excise taxes and local taxes on cigarettes make the total tax-to-price ratio for cigarettes higher in the
P.Tax regions.
If increases in e-cigarette tax rates expand to all the states in the U.S., these increases would make
the average e-cigarette tax-to-price ratio equal to the current state-level cigarette excise tax-to-price ratio at
26.2%14. Since the ratios of tax-to-price for e-cigarettes and cigarettes in the P.Tax regions are almost equal,
this is similar to the scenario of tax expansion in all the states. Accordingly, I would use the estimates 15 of
own-price elasticity of e-cigarette demand and pass-through rates for e-cigarette taxes in the P.Tax regions
in the following calculations. This means the average increases of e-cigarette taxes per ml across the U.S.
would be $2.67416. This makes the average tax rate and the price of e-cigarettes $2.862 per ml and $10.997
per ml respectively. When -3.311 is used as the own-price elasticity of e-cigarette demand, sales quantities
of e-cigarettes would reduce 89.7%17. The yearly sales quantities of e-cigarettes in ml would reduce from
181,11818 to 18,55219, if the sales price is kept constant. Yearly e-cigarette tax revenues would increase
from $34,05020 to $53,09621.
According to my estimates from the main results, sales quantities and revenues of cigarettes would
not change when ratios of taxes to price for cigarettes and e-cigarettes are similar. Sales quantities and
revenues of SCP would increase after the tax increases of e-cigarettes. The average yearly sales units of
SCP would increase by 1,890,14222; this would generate additional sales revenues of SCP by $882,212 23.
If the average state-level sales tax rate in the U.S. were 6%, the additional state-level sales tax collected
from SCP in each region would be $52,933. The yearly state sales taxes collected from e-cigarettes would

14 (1.790/6.836)*100%
15 These values are -3.311 and 0.421.
16

If 100%*(0.188+x)/(9.871+2.674*0.421)=26.2%, then x= 2.674.

17

(3.311*2.674/9.871)*100%

18

3,463.80*52

19

181,118*(1-0.897)

20

0.188*181,118

21

2.862*18,552

22

335,452.43*0.400*(2.674/9.871)*52

23

1,271,653*0.435

14

reduce from $107,26924 to $12,24125. The total changes in state tax revenues collected from e-cigarettes
and SCP would reduce $22,989, from $141,31926 to $118,33027. In reality, the sales price of e-cigarettes on
the supply side would decline over time, if no taxes have been added. This reality means the equilibrium
sales quantities would be much greater than the estimate from the demand side at 18,552. As indicated in
the P.Tax regions, the sales reduction of e-cigarettes is 58.8% instead of 89.7% in reality. That means the
real sales quantities of e-cigarettes could be 74,62128 ml. The real equilibrium price for e-cigarettes could
be lower than $10.997 per ml after the tax change across the U.S. In this case, my calculations can be used
as a lower bound of the practice. That means the total annual reduction in tax revenues collected could be
much smaller than $22,989. Considering the health benefits generated from using more SCP without
increasing usage of cigarettes, the revenue decrease should be acceptable.
Similarly, House Bill H.R. 4742 would tax e-cigarettes at $0.0278 per milligram (mg) of nicotine
at the federal level, equivalent to the $1.01 federal levy per pack of cigarettes on tobacco alternatives. For
instance, the average Juul pod contains nicotine at 59 mg/ml. A particular Juul pod contains 0.7 ml of liquid
and costs $4.5 on average. Each pod would face an e-cigarette tax of $1.14829. This tax would raise ecigarette prices by $0.69130 per ml. This also means that the tax would raise the price of a Juul pod by
10.7%31. This price increase would cause sales quantities to reduce by 35.6%32 if Juul maintains the current
price. After the tax, the federal tax-to-price ratio for each pod would be 25.5%33. Adding the average
state/region e-cigarette taxes at $0.188 per ml, the ratio would be 28.4%34. In contrast, the current cigarette
federal and state excise taxes to price ratio in all the regions is 41% 35. According to my results, sales of
cigarettes would not change when the tax-to-price ratio of e-cigarettes is similar to or below that of
cigarettes.
Thus, my research provides evidence that adjusting tax rates of e-cigarettes similar to the tax-toprice ratio of cigarettes is both effective in regulating sales of e-cigarettes and economically affordable from

24

181,118*9.871*0.06

25

18,552*10.997*0.06

26

$34,050+$107,269

27

$53,096+$12,241+$52,933

28

181,118*(1-0.588)

29

$0.0278*59*0.7

30

$0.0278*59*0.421

31

$0.691*0.7/$4.5

32

10.7*3.311

33

($1.148/$4.5)*100%

34

(($0.188*0.7+$1.148)/$4.5)*100%

35

(($1.01+$1.790)/6.836)*100%
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the perspective of tax revenues. Therefore, it is feasible to expand e-cigarette taxes to all the states in the
U.S., if the goal is to curb nicotine addiction from e-cigarettes and cigarettes. One limitation of our research
is that the Nielsen Retail Scanner Data does not cover vaping stores, and has limited coverage of sales from
online stores, liquor stores, and convenience stores. However, the rich weekly sales data covering many
years at the product level could balance this limitation to some degree. Additionally, because the public
cares about youth addiction to e-cigarettes, an expansion of e-cigarette taxes, together with the recent
Tobacco 21 laws and flavor bans for e-cigarettes (US Food & Drug Administration, 2020a & 2020b), could
curb both the initiation of e-cigarette use and the switch back to cigarettes. For adult smokers, the expansion
policies would not encourage them to switch to cigarettes nor use more e-cigarettes, but rather possibly
increase their use of SCP to quit smoking, as taxes for cigarettes and e-cigarettes would make these products
less affordable than before, if the expansion happens.
Last but not least, my estimates of the own-price elasticity of cigarette demand are consistent with
the consensus estimate by hundreds of studies from a thorough review of the literature. Using the same
method, I reach an estimate of the own-price elasticity of e-cigarette demand larger than the absolute
magnitude of -1.3, which is resulted from the DID by Cotti et al., (2020). Also, consistent with the literature,
my estimate of the pass-through rate of cigarette excise taxes shows that the tax is a little more than fully
passed on to consumers. With the same methods, my results show that consumers partially bear the burden
of e-cigarette taxes while Cotti et al., (2020) reach an estimate of the pass-through36 rate of 1.5 and indicate
the e-cigarette industry is moderate to highly concentrated. Conditioning on the market structures for
cigarettes and e-cigarettes are not perfectly competitive, but they are oligopolistic, to be specific. I believe
the different magnitudes of the pass-through rates for e-cigarette and cigarette taxes I reached could be
because e-cigarettes are price elastic but cigarettes are inelastic, as well as the average tax rate of cigarettes
is higher than that of e-cigarettes.

36

Pass-through measures the rate of the tax burden carried by consumers on tax incidence (when a new
tax is introduced or changed magnitudes). Under perfect competition, the parties with inelastic
supply or demand bear more taxes. Under imperfect competition, pass-through rate also
depends on the tax rate and mark-up. When mark-up is higher, pass-through rate is also higher.
Keeping mark-up constant, raising tax rates increases pass-through or the tax burden carried by
consumers. (See Weyl and Fabinger, 2013 for more information.)

16

Table 1.1 Variable Means in the Treated and Control Regions of E-Cigarette Taxes
Variables
Control
Treated-Pre
Treated-Tax
All Regions
Cig Taxes($/pack)
0.232
0.392
0.973
0.308
Ecig SFA Laws
0.088
0.018
0.080
0.078
R.Licensure
0.095
0.208
0.460
0.137
R.to Minors
0.550
0.394
0.897
0.553
Q_Ecig(unit)
6,276.75
6,054.34
5,551.26
6,193.41
P_Ecig($/unit)
5.986
6.332
6.798
6.093
Q_Ecig(ml)
3,538.00
3,499.19
2,584.49
3,463.80
P_Ecig($/ml)
9.649
10.685
10.725
9.871
R_Ecig($)
37,180.23
35,975.26
33,956.66
36,779.70
Q_Cig(pack)
382,107.03
376,328.93
251,284.32
371,863.45
P_Cig($/pack)
6.682
7.247
7.735
6.836
R_Cig($)
2,506,434.44
2,278,791.58
1,644,891.367
2,412,546.82
Q_SCP(unit)
312,293.56
427,119.67
411,439.14
335,452.43
P_SCP($/unit)
0.435
0.447
0.416
0.435
R_SCP($)
135,224.22
186,109.65
162,080.09
144,254.77
Population (thousands)
5,701.17
8,494.07
5,753.75
6,094.27
Cig Taxes Level ($/pack)
1.760
1.678
2.341
1.790
Observations
13,530
2,392
1,238
17,160
Ecig Tax Conversion Based on Wholesale Price Calculations (a)
Ecig Taxes($/ml): P.Tax Regions
4.374
Ecig Taxes($/ml): V.Tax Regions
0.463
Ecig Taxes($/ml): All Treated
2.605
0.188
Ecig Tax Conversion Based on DC Taxes (b)
Ecig Taxes($/ml): P.Tax Regions
4.879
Ecig Taxes($/ml): V.Tax Regions
0.463
Ecig Taxes($/ml): All Treated
2.882
0.208
Additional Variables for Calculations
P_Ecig($/unit): P.Tax Regions
6.031
7.535
P_Ecig($/unit): V.Tax Regions
6.537
5.906
P_Ecig($/ml): P.Tax Regions
11.368
11.870
P_Ecig($/ml): V.Tax Regions
10.218
9.337
P_Cig($/pack): P.Tax Regions
7.425
8.015
P_Cig($/pack): V.Tax Regions
7.125
7.397
Q_Ecig(unit): P.Tax Regions
9424.65
5613.19
Q_Ecig(unit): V.Tax Regions
3747.34
5476.28
Q_Ecig(ml): P.Tax Regions
5106.95
2003.49
Q_Ecig(ml): V.Tax Regions
2398.67
3287.92
Q_Cig(pack): P.Tax Regions
490,693.20
183,326.43
Q_Cig(pack): V.Tax Regions
298,045.78
333,561.90
Cig Taxes($/pack): P.Tax Regions
0.009
0.871
Cig Taxes($/pack): V.Tax Regions
0.654
1.097
Cig Taxes Level($/pack): P.Tax Regions
1.971
2.810
Cig Taxes Level($/pack): V.Tax Regions
1.479
1.772
Source: Authors’ calculations from the Nielsen Retail Scanner Data in weeks from September 12, 2011, to
December 30, 2017. All prices, revenues, and taxes are inflation-adjusted to 2017 December. Cig means
cigarette. SFA denotes smoke-free air laws. R.Licensure means retail licensure on e-cigarettes (Ecig). R.to
refers to restrictions on Ecig sales to minors.
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Table 1.2 E-Cigarette Tax Impact on the Quantities of E-Cigarettes: by Tax Indicator
LogQ_Ecig (unit)
LogQ_Ecig (ml)
DID
GSC
DID
GSC
Overall Overall
Overall
Overall
Overall Overall
Overall Overall
Policy
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Variables
Ecig Taxes
-0.045
-0.351*
-0.580** -0.635** 0.137
-0.032
-0.069
-0.064
(0.143) (0.188)
(0.186)
(0.197)
(0.090) (0.144)
(0.100) (0.106)
Cig Taxes ($)
0.363**
0.078*
0.209
-0.021
(0.184)
(0.061)
(0.134)
(0.046)
Ecig SFA Laws
0.217
-0.049
0.018
-0.003
(0.176)
(0.051)
(0.126)
(0.067)
*
R.Licensure
0.212
-0.033
0.069
-0.019
(0.114)
(0.032)
(0.085)
(0.035)
R.to Minors
-0.148**
-0.034
-0.119**
-0.016
Observations
Treated Regions

17,160
11

(0.073)
17,160
11

17,160
11

(0.024)
17,160
11

17,160
11

(0.058)
17,160
11

17,160
11

(0.017)
17,160
11

LogQ_Ecig (unit)
LogQ_Ecig (ml)
GSC
P.Tax
V.Tax
P.Tax
V.Tax
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
-1.010**
(0.381)
0.078*
(0.045)
-0.049
(0.058)
-0.033
(0.032)
-0.034

-0.172
(0.183)
0.078*
(0.048)
-0.049
(0.050)
-0.033
(0.032)
-0.034

-0.101
(0.142)
-0.021
(0.047)
-0.003
(0.054)
-0.019
(0.034)
-0.016

0.082
(0.101)
-0.021
(0.049)
-0.003
(0.053)
-0.019
(0.035)
-0.016

(0.024)
15,180
5

(0.024)
15,510
6

(0.018)
15,180
5

(0.018)
15,510
6

Note: Regressions include region fixed effects (FE), week FE, and 41 control regions. Regressions with the GSC have five unobserved factors but
DID has none. Robust errors in parentheses are based on parametric bootstraps of 1,000 times. Asterisks ***, **, and * are significant levels at 1%,
5%, and 10% respectively. LogQ(unit) are logs of the total e-cigarette (Ecig) products sold in the smallest units; LogQ (ml) are logs of the total Ecig
vaping liquid sold in ml. Regions with price taxes (P.Tax) include CA, DC, M1, MN, PA. Regions with volumetric taxes (V.Tax) include C1, C2,
KS, LA, NC, and WV. C1 is the city of Chicago, C2 is the rest of Cook County in IL, and M1 is Montgomery County in MD. R.Licensure means
retail licensure on Ecig. R.to refers to restrictions on Ecig sales to minors. Cig means cigarette.

18

Table 1.3 E-Cigarette Tax Impact on Prices and Revenues of E-Cigarettes: by Tax Indicator
LogP_Ecig(unit)
LogP_Ecig(ml)

LogR_Ecig

P.Tax

V.Tax

Overall

P.Tax

V.Tax

Overall

P.Tax

V.Tax

Overall

Policy Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

Ecig Taxes

0.305***

0.046*

0.178***

0.107

0.027

0.068

-0.588**

0.046*

-0.392**

(0.040)

(0.021)

(0.022)

(0.112)

(0.082)

(0.073)

(0.226)

(0.021)

(0.122)

-0.002

-0.002

-0.002

-0.050

-0.050

-0.050

0.050

0.050

0.050

(0.017)

(0.016)

(0.016)

(0.036)

(0.038)

(0.033)

(0.045)

(0.043)

(0.046)

0.007

0.006

0.006

-0.085*

-0.085*

-0.085*

-0.010

-0.010

-0.010

(0.059)

(0.028)

(0.027)

(0.049)

(0.048)

(0.047)

(0.052)

(0.048)

(0.052)

0.012

0.012

0.012

-0.013

-0.013

-0.013

-0.005

-0.005

-0.005

(0.014)

(0.014)

(0.013)

(0.025)

(0.025)

(0.024)

(0.029)

(0.031)

(0.029)

-0.006

-0.006

-0.006

0.003

0.003

0.003

-0.008

-0.008

-0.008

(0.008)

(0.007)

(0.008)

(0.013)

(0.014)

(0.013)

(0.020)

(0.020)

(0.020)

Observations

15,180

15,510

17,160

15,180

15,510

17,160

15,180

15,510

17,160

Treated Regions

5

6

11

5

6

11

5

6

11

Cig Taxes ($)

Ecig SFA Laws

R.Licensure

R.to Minors

Note: All regressions use the GSC strategy; all include region fixed effects (FE), week FE, and have five unobserved factors. Each regression has 41
control regions. Robust errors in parentheses are based on parametric bootstraps of 1,000 times. Asterisks ***, **, and * are significant levels at 1%,
5%, and 10% respectively. In a particular region, LogP(unit) refers to logs of the weekly average price for e-cigarettes(Ecig) at the unit level;
LogP(ml) means logs of the weekly average price for Ecig liquid at the ml level; LogR is logs of total weekly sales revenues. All prices and revenues
are inflation-adjusted with CPI to the level of 2017 December. Regions with price taxes (P.Tax) include CA, DC, M1, MN, and PA. Regions with
volumetric taxes (V.Tax) include C1, C2, KS, LA, NC, and WV. C1 is the city of Chicago, C2 is the rest of Cook County in IL, and M1 is Montgomery
County in MD. R.Licensure means retail licensure on Ecig. R.to refers to restrictions on Ecig sales to minors. Cig means cigarette. EET refers to
Ecig taxes.
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Table 1.4 E-cigarette Tax Impact on the Quantities, Prices, and Revenues of Cigarettes and SCP: by Tax Indicator
LogQ
LogP
P.Tax
V.Tax
Overall
P.Tax
V.Tax
Overall
P.Tax
Policy Variables
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Panel A: Cig
Ecig Taxes
0.202
-0.166
0.022
0.016
0.023
0.020**
0.148
(0.118)
(0.101)
(0.066)
(0.012)
(0.013)
(0.009)
(0.118)
***
***
***
***
***
***
Cig Taxes ($)
-0.088
-0.088
-0.088
0.140
0.140
0.140
0.056**
(0.013)
(0.014)
(0.015)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.015)
Panel B: SCP
Ecig Taxes
0.122**
0.004
0.064*
0.033***
-0.010
0.010*
0.082*
(0.035)
(0.033)
(0.025)
(0.011)
(0.008)
(0.007)
(0.037)
Cig Taxes ($)
0.014
0.014
0.014
0.001
0.003
0.003
0.012
(0.010)
(0.010)
(0.010)
(0.001)
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.010)
Observations
15,180
15,510
17,160
15,180
15,510
17,160
15,180
Treated Regions
5
6
11
5
6
11
5

LogR
V.Tax
(8)

Overall
(9)

-0.093
(0.100)
0.056***
(0.014)

0.030
(0.070)
0.056**
(0.015)

0.022
(0.032)
0.012
(0.009)
15,510
6

0.052
(0.025)
0.012
(0.009)
17,160
11

Note: All regressions use the GSC strategy, include both region fixed effects (FE) and week FE, and have five unobserved factors. Each regression
has 41 control regions. Standard errors in parentheses are based on parametric bootstraps of 1,000 times. Asterisks ***, **, and * are significant
levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. In a particular region, LogQ is logs of the total cigarette (Cig) packs or SCP units sold; LogP is logs of the
weekly average price for each pack of Cig or each unit of SCP; LogR is logs of total weekly sales revenues. All prices and revenues are inflationadjusted with CPI to the level of 2017 December. Regions with price taxes (P.Tax) include CA, DC, M1, MN, and PA. Regions with volumetric taxes
(V.Tax) include C1, C2, KS, LA, NC, and WV. C1 is the city of Chicago, C2 is the rest of Cook County in IL, and M1 is Montgomery County in
MD. R.Licensure means retail licensure on e-cigarettes (Ecig). R.to refers to restrictions on Ecig sales to minors. EET refers to Ecig taxes.
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Table 1.5 The Effects of EET on the Sales Quantities, Prices, and Revenues of E-Cigarettes (in Logs): by Tax Per ml
LogP (unit)
LogQ(ml)
LogQ (unit)

LogP(ml)

P.Tax

V. Tax

Overall

P.Tax

V. Tax

Overall

P.Tax

V. Tax

Overall

P.Tax

V. Tax

Overall

Policy Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

Ecig Taxes ($)

-0.009

-0.160***

-0.009

0.032*

0.118***

0.036**

-0.021

-0.136***

-0.021

0.042**

0.115***

0.048**

(0.021)

(0.032)

(0.019)

(0.016)

(0.009)

(0.015)

(0.029)

(0.017)

(0.029)

(0.020)

(0.009)

(0.019)

0.164

0.158*

0.106

0.019

-0.044**

0.0005

0.182**

0.115**

0.120**

0.037

-0.018

0.013

(0.122)

(0.082)

(0.066)

(0.063)

(0.019)

(0.040)

(0.069)

(0.044)

(0.053)

(0.027)

(0.023)

(0.022)

Cig Taxes ($)

LogR

Ecig Taxes ($)

(13)

(14)

(15)

0.023

-0.042

0.027*

(0.027)

(0.016)

(0.015)
Cig Taxes ($)

**

*

0.184

0.114

(0.074)

(0.067)

0.106*
(0.053)

Note: All regressions use the generalized DID identification strategy. Regressions include region fixed effects (FE) and time FE. Time FE includes year
FE, quarter FE, month FE, week FE, and their interactions. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the state level. Asterisks ***, **, and * are
significant levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Overall regressions include 11 treated regions, 41 control regions, and 17,160 observations. Price tax
(P.Tax) regressions include 5, 41, and 15,180 for these items. Volumetric tax (V.Tax) regressions include 6, 41, and 15,510 respectively. In a particular
region, LogQ(unit) means logs of the total e-cigarette products purchased in the smallest units; LogQ(ml) denotes logs of the total e-cigarette vaping
liquid purchased in ml. LogP(unit) represents logs of the weekly average price for e-cigarette at the unit level. LogP(ml) refers to logs of the weekly
average prices for e-cigarette liquid at the ml level. All prices, Ecig taxes per ml, and Cig tax increases are inflation-adjusted with CPI to the level of
2017 December. Regions with P.Tax include CA, DC, M1, MN, and PA. Regions with V.Tax include C1, C2, KS, LA, NC, and WV. C1 is the city of
Chicago, C2 is the rest of Cook County in IL, and M1 is Montgomery County in MD. Cig means cigarette. EET is e-cigarette taxes. Results for other
policy variables are not shown.
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Table 1.6 The Effects of EET on Sales Quantities of E-Cigarettes, Cigarettes, and SCP: Instrumenting Prices with Taxes
LogQ(unit)_Ecig

LogQ(ml)_Ecig

LogQ(unit)_Cig

LogQ(unit)_SCP

P.Tax

V. Tax

All

P.Tax

V. Tax

All

P. Tax

V. Tax

All

P.Tax

V. Tax

All

Policy Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

Ecig Price ($)

-0.174

-1.286***

-0.179**

-0.397***

-1.107***

-0.382***

1.006***

-0.119***

0.903***

0.189***

0.125***

0.203***

(0.143)

(0.117)

(0.090)

(0.102)

(0.125)

(0.059)

(0.106)

(0.056)

(0.044)

(0.031)

(0.042)

(0.021)

Cig Price ($)

1.041

***

(0.124)
Ecig SFA Laws

0.260

***

0.815

***

(0.075)
0.292

***

0.767

***

(0.059)
0.276

***

1.219

***

(0.130)
0.174

***

0.768

***

(0.072)
0.288

***

0.905

***

(0.052)
0.184

***

-0.955

***

(0.083)
-0.198

***

-0.988

***

(0.032)

-1.072

***

(0.038)

-0.0002

-0.164

***

0.040

*

-0.117

(0.022)
-0.034

***

***

(0.024)
-0.035

***

-0.083***
(0.019)
-0.035***

(0.024)

(0.015)

(0.015)

(0.031)

(0.031)

(0.018)

(0.026)

(0.014)

(0.013)

(0.009)

(0.010)

(0.007)

0.158***

0.129***

0.128***

0.102***

0.123***

0.086***

-0.068***

0.036***

-0.004

0.014***

0.008**

0.018***

(0.014)

(0.010)

(0.009)

(0.017)

(0.012)

(0.009)

(0.016)

(0.005)

(0.007)

(0.005)

(0.004)

(0.003)

-0.106***

-0.118***

-0.107***

-0.116***

-0.124***

-0.109***

0.020***

0.024***

0.026***

-0.013***

-0.013***

-0.012***

(0.009)

(0.008)

(0.007)

(0.008)

(0.008)

(0.007)

(0.006)

(0.003)

(0.005)

(0.002)

(0.003)

(0.002)

Observations

15,180

15,510

17,160

15,180

15,510

17,160

15,180

15,510

17,160

15,180

15,510

17,160

Treated Regions

5

6

11

5

6

11

5

6

11

5

6

11

R.Licensure

R.to Minors

Note: All regressions use the generalized DID identification strategy. FE means fixed-effects. Time FE includes year FE, quarter FE, month FE, week
FE, and their interactions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the state level. Asterisks ***, **, and * are significant levels at 1%,
5%, and 10% respectively. In a particular region, LogQ(unit) is logs of the total products sold in the smallest units; LogQ(ml) is logs of the total ecigarette vaping liquid purchased in ml. E-cigarette (Ecig) prices and cigarette (Cig) prices are instrumented with Ecig tax changes per ml and Cig tax
changes per pack; all are inflation-adjusted with CPI to the level of 2017 December. Regions with price taxes (P.Tax) include C1, C2, CA, DC, M1,
MN, and PA. Regions with volumetric taxes (V.Tax) include KS, LA, NC, and WV. C1 is the city of Chicago, C2 is the rest of Cook County in IL, and
M1 is Montgomery County in MD. EET means e-cigarette taxes.
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Figure 1.1 Treatment Status by Week for September 12, 2011, through December 30, 2017
Note: C1 is the city of Chicago, C2 is the rest of Cook County, C3 is the rest of the counties in IL; M1 is Montgomery County, M2 is the rest of
the counties in MD.
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Figure 1.2 E-Cigarette Tax Impact on Sales and Price of E-Cigarettes: Counterfactual and
ATT
Note: The top panels are for sales quantity and the bottom panels are for prices. The shaded area in
the right figures is 95% confidence intervals for the estimated average treatment effect on the treated
(ATT). CT stands for counterfactual.
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(a) Factors for logQ(unit)

(b) Loadings for logQ(uni

(c) Factors for logP(unit)

(d) Loadings for logP(unit)

Figure 1.3 E-Cigarette Tax Impacts on Sales and Price of E-Cigarettes: Factors and
Loadings
Note: Figures (b) and (d) show the first two important factor loadings.
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CHAPTER 2. EXAMINING THE EFFECTS OF E-CIGARETTE TAXES AND
REGULATIONS ON THE DEMAND FOR TOBACCO PRODUCTS
2.1

Introduction
Manufacturers advertise e-cigarettes as a better alternative to cigarettes (Dave et al., 2019b,

Farsalinos and Polosa, 2014); however, public health advocates are concerned with their health
consequences, especially on youth addiction (Counotte et al., 2009, Dwyer et al., 2009, Slawecki
et al., 2005). Recently, a growing number of state and local legislatures in the U.S. have passed
laws to regulate sales of e-cigarettes with taxes, concerning public health and generating tax
revenues. As of February 2020, 19 states and the District of Columbia imposed e-cigarette taxes
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2020). Some of these jurisdictions use ad valorem
taxes while others use specific excise taxes. At the federal level, though a tax policy on e-cigarettes
is still not in place, House Bill H.R. 4742 would tax e-cigarettes at $0.0278 per milligram (mg) of
nicotine, equivalent to the $1.01 federal levy per pack of cigarettes.
As e-cigarette taxes attract the attention of lawmakers and the public, researchers are also
motivated to study the effects of e-cigarette taxes from different perspectives. On purchases of
tobacco products, Amato and Boyle (2016) qualitatively evaluate an e-cigarette tax in Minnesota
on purchases of e-cigarettes, reaching mixed results. Applying a two-way fixed-effects model, Cotti
et al., (2020) find that e-cigarettes taxes reduce flavored e-cigarette sales and cause large
substitution toward mentholated traditional cigarettes. Utilizing a different identification strategy,
generalized synthetic control for causal inference, my first essay (2020) shows that e-cigarette taxes
reduce sales of e-cigarettes; I also indicate that changes in e-cigarette taxes do not raise sales of
cigarettes when the tax-to-price ratio of e-cigarettes is below or similar to that of cigarettes after
tax increases.
On prenatal tobacco use, Abouk et al. (2019) find that e-cigarette taxes reduce prepregnancy e-cigarette use, increase pre-pregnancy smoking and prenatal smoking, as well as lower
smoking cessation during pregnancy. On teenage tobacco use, Pesko and Warman (2017) show
that higher e-cigarette taxes reduce youth e-cigarette use and may increase youth smoking intensity
while youth may switch back to e-cigarettes from cigarettes when cigarette tax increases. On adult
smoking and smoking cessation, Saffer et al. (2020) find that the e-cigarette tax in Minnesota
increases adult smoking and reduces smoking cessation.
Aside from research regarding e-cigarette taxes, a myriad of studies have investigated the
effects of other tobacco product restrictions on the demand for tobacco products. For example,
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Amato et al. (2015) provide evidence that cigarette taxes negatively affect cigarette sales in
Minnesota. Similarly, Cotti et al. (2018) show that higher cigarette excise taxes decrease both
cigarette and e-cigarette purchases, cigarette smoke-free air (SFA) laws decrease cigarette
purchases, e-cigarette SFA laws do not affect cigarette or e-cigarette purchases. Likewise, Tauras
(2006) discovers that more restrictive cigarette SFA laws decrease the average smoking amount by
adult smokers. Furthermore, when investigating the effects of e-cigarette regulations on the demand
for e-cigarettes, Pesko et al. (2016) find that proposed taxes on e-cigarettes, warning labels, and
restrictions on e-cigarette flavors are associated with reducing the number of adult smokers who
would switch to e-cigarettes.
Additionally, researchers reach mixed results of policy effects, which may be related to
different data, various investigated samples, and diverse identification strategies. For example,
Friedman (2015), Dave et al. (2019a), and Pesko et al. (2016) find evidence that e-cigarette
regulations may increase the uses of cigarettes; while Abouk and Adams (2017) find that restricting
youth access to e-cigarettes reduce both conventional cigarettes uses and e-cigarette sales.
However, a research gap in the literature exists in investigating the heterogeneous effects
of the two types of e-cigarette taxes—ad valorem taxes and specific excise taxes—on individual
household purchases. Also, examining causal responses of tobacco-user subgroups based on usage
of different tobacco product types is essential as these subgroups may respond differently to policy
changes (Nesson, E., 2017; Robertson et al., 2019). Results from these investigations would provide

information for policymakers on the decisions of e-cigarette taxes in the next step. I aim to fill this
research gap and contribute to the literature by investigating the causal effects of e-cigarette taxes
on the demand for e-cigarettes, cigarettes, and smoking-cessation products (SCP) among U.S.
adults. Meanwhile, I incorporate influences of other related tobacco policies and regulations37 on
the demand for these products. To the author’ knowledge, little to no research exists exploring the
effects of U.S. laws requiring licenses for over-the-counter sales of e-cigarettes and e-cigarette
packaging regulations on the demand for tobacco products in the current literature, though articles
are available discussing the access of e-cigarettes through medical prescriptions in Australia (Fraser
et al., 2015, Gartner and Hall, 2015).
To fulfill these research purposes, I use a generalized difference-in-differences
identification strategy supporting a causal interpretation of policy effects on demand. The data that
I have utilized is a large panel of adult households from the Nielsen Consumer Panel (NCP) Data

37

The second section of this paper discusses these policies and regulations.
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from 2012 to 201838. The limitation of this data is that it does not cover purchases from tobacco
and vape shops which might influence the generalization of the results obtained. However, to my

knowledge, NCP data includes the most comprehensive adult e-cigarette purchases from a longer
timespan than other datasets. Moreover, NCP data offers representative prices for application in
tobacco price research (Lusk and Brooks, 2011, Opazo Breton et al., 2018). Since purchases by the
household are scanned and recorded immediately after each shopping trip, on the precision of price
and quantities provided, unlike retrospective self-reported data, no evidence shows that NCP data
contains meaningful measurement errors (Einav et al., 2010).
My results show that, on average, e-cigarette taxes do not influence cigarette purchases
while decreasing SCP purchases. Comparing the effects of two types of e-cigarette taxes, ad
valorem taxes have a larger average tax rate than that of specific excise taxes after converting them
in the same unit. In terms of effects on the demand, ad valorem taxes do not increase purchases of
cigarettes nor e-cigarettes but negatively influence purchases of SCP; specific excise taxes increase
purchases of cigarettes and e-cigarettes, as well as have larger negative effects on SCP purchases
than do ad valorem taxes. Furthermore, investigating heterogeneous effects of e-cigarette taxes on
seven subgroups of ever-purchasers of the three products, I find that these subgroups respond
differently to the two types of e-cigarette taxes. From the perspective of tobacco control, it seems
that specific excise taxes bring negative health externalities to all subgroups of e-cigarette
purchasers except for triple purchasers of the three products by increasing e-cigarette purchases if
e-cigarettes are considered with health risks. In comparison, no evidence shows that ad valorem
taxes cause health concerns to any subgroups of purchasers.
The rest of this essay exhibits as follows. The next section provides an introduction to ecigarette taxes and related policies in the U.S. The third section describes data. The empirical
strategy section describes empirical methodologies. The next two sections review the results and
investigate heterogeneous effects. The last section concludes the essay.

2.2

E-Cigarette Taxes and Related Policies in the U.S.
The main focus of the policies is e-cigarette taxes in this essay. The following is an

introduction to e-cigarette taxes and related policies I control for in my analysis. In 2010, Minnesota
(MN) started to tax e-cigarettes at a percentage of the wholesale price. As the second state in the

38 I use data in these years is because the latest data available in Nielsen is from 2018 and the
earliest meaningful e-cigarette purchase data starts in 2012 (lots of purchase data is missing
before 2012 as e-cigarette sales was new).
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U.S. to tax e-cigarettes, North Carolina (NC) implemented a specific excise tax on e-cigarettes at
$0.050 for each milliliter(ml) of the nicotine liquid contained in 2015. Since then, more states and
local jurisdictions have imposed e-cigarette taxes (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
2019a; Cammenga, 2019), following the models of MN or NC. I use regions to refer to these state
and local jurisdictions. By the end of 2018, e-cigarette taxes have two types: ad valorem taxes and
specific excise taxes. An ad valorem tax, as that in MN, is a percentage of the wholesale or retail
price of e-cigarettes. In contrast, a specific excise tax, as the one in NC, is based on the milliliters
(mls) of the consumable liquid volume contained in products.
In this essay, I refer to ad valorem taxes as price tax (P.Tax) and specific excise taxes as a
volumetric tax (V.Tax). Accordingly, regions with P.Tax are P.Tax regions while regions with
V.Tax are denoted as V.Tax regions. Regions that are not P.Tax (V.Tax) regions include the V.Tax
(P.Tax) regions and the control regions which never implement e-cigarette taxes. In my
investigation time interval, five regions are P.Tax regions including California (CA), District of
Columbia (DC), Montgomery county (M1) in Maryland, Minnesota (MN), and Pennsylvania (PA).
Eight regions that have applied V.Tax are Chicago (C1) in Illinois (IL), Cook County (C2) in IL,
Louisiana (LA), North Carolina (NC), Kansas (KS), West Virginia (WV), Delaware (DE), and New
Jerse (NJ). Additionally, Alaska, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, and Hawaii also imposed ecigarette taxes but purchase data in these regions are not available in my purchase data source.
Therefore, policies in these regions are not included in my analyses if any exists.

E-cigarette taxes are measured differently for P.Tax and V.Tax because one is based on
price and the other one is based on volume. To compare the effects of these two types of taxes, one
needs to unify them with the same unit. In my case, I have converted the P.Tax from a percentage
of the price to the same unit as V.Tax, dollars per ml ($/ml). I have achieved the conversion39 in
three steps. First, I have converted e-cigarette prices from dollars per unit to dollars per ml. To
fulfill this task, I have matched40 the e-cigarette purchase data in NCP with characteristics41 of ecigarettes, specifically the ml content for each e-cigarette unit. Second, I have calculated the
approximations of wholesale price from the retail price obtained in the first step. Third, I have

39

See Appendix1 in Deng (2020) for details of the conversion.

40

The match rate is over 85%.

41

These e-cigarette characteristics are from Cotti et al., (2018) and Cotti et al., (2020). The authors
of this paper would like to acknowledge their generosity for sharing the data.
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multiplied wholesale prices with the tax rates in percentages, then divided the result by the total ml
contained, to get the tax rates in the unit of dollars per ml.
Compared with e-cigarette taxes, cigarette excise taxes are not new. All U.S. states, the
District of Columbia, and the territories had implemented cigarette taxes by 1969. The unit of these
taxes are dollars per pack. In my investigated period, 2012-2018, 23 states had multiple changes in
the rates of cigarette taxes, varying from decreasing $0.010 to increasing $2.500 per pack
(Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, 2020a). In the three local jurisdictions with e-cigarette taxes,
Chicago and Cook County also changed cigarette taxes in the period. In all the tax changes, except
for one tax decrease, all other changes are tax increases. Aside from taxes, another important ecigarette regulation is e-cigarette packaging regulations. Since 2014, jurisdictions have started to
regulate e-cigarettes to be sold in child-resistant packaging, excluding e-cigarette products sold in
sealed, pre-filled, or disposable replacement cartridges that are not intended to be opened by the
consumer. Such packaging is required to protect children from serious personal injury or serious
illness resulting from the handling, using, or ingesting such substances.
As to retail licensure, states typically require retailers to obtain a license or permit from the
state or local government for selling cigarettes or other tobacco products. On e-cigarettes
particularly, by 2018, sixteen states and the District of Columbia had laws effective on requiring ecigarette retailers and vape shops to obtain a license or a permit. Concerning the SFA laws, they
prohibit the use of e-cigarettes or cigarettes in indoor areas of private worksites, restaurants, and
bars by the corresponding SFA laws on e-cigarettes or cigarettes. On the age restrictions of ecigarette sales to minors, 18 was for most states, and up to age 19 or 21 for a few states. Recently,
on December 20, 2019, the Tobacco 21 Act (FDA, 2020) raised the federal minimum age of sale
of tobacco products from 18 to 21 years, effective immediately. This act is also applicable to ecigarettes as they are classified as tobacco products by the FDA (2016). If a state chooses to
continue with current age laws, it may face the risk of losing federal funding.
Additionally, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) gives states the option of expanding their
standard Medicaid program. States that adopted the expansion could extend coverage to large
numbers of adult smokers who are not eligible for traditional Medicaid cessation coverage, thereby
increasing the potential impact of Medicaid cessation coverage. The status of the Medicaid
expansion for states could be not adopted, adopted but not implemented, as well as adopted and
implemented. I am interested in the policy effects of status change for implementation so I have
used whether a state’s status was adopted and implemented as the measure for this policy change.
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2.3

Data
Data mainly contains two parts: policy data and purchase data. I use these data to

investigate the causal effects of policies on the purchase of e-cigarettes, cigarettes, and SCP. The
policy data come from government websites of jurisdictions, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC)’s State Tobacco Activities Tracking and Evaluation (STATE) System (2019b),
the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids (2020a, 2020b), and Public Health Law Center (2020). The
timespan of my research is from 2012 to 2018. My focus of the policies is on e-cigarette taxes. I
also control for related policies and regulations including cigarette excise taxes, e-cigarette
packaging regulations, the requirement of licenses for over-the-counter (OTC) sales of e-cigarettes,
laws restricting sales of e-cigarettes to minors, SFA laws that restrict uses of e-cigarettes, SFA laws
that restrict uses of cigarettes, and implementation status of a state for Medicaid expansion with
tobacco cessation treatments via the Affordable Care Act.
To recover the causal effects of these policies, my policy data use changes in these policies.
This is because policy changes are required in causal inference to compare the treated regions and
quarters with the control regions and quarters. If a region in a quarter had a change for a particular
policy, this region is treated, and this quarter is a treated quarter for this policy. Otherwise, in the
selected time interval, regions that never had a change of such policy serve as controls for regions
that had. Similarly, if a region had a change of such policy in a certain quarter, the quarters before
the effective date for this region serve as controls for the treated quarters.
The policy changes possess two types in my investigation. The first type is for e-cigarette
taxes and cigarette taxes. This type is a change of tax rates from zero or non-zero level to a different
level. I use continuous variables to show changes in dollar amounts for e-cigarette taxes and
cigarette taxes. For example, the nominal change of e-cigarette tax was $0.050 per ml in KS in
2017Q3, and all quarters after, as no other changes happened in KS after that. Similarly, the nominal
change of cigarette tax in KS was $0.500 per pack in 2015Q3 and all quarters after. The second
type of policy change is for all other policies. This type is policy change from no implementation
to implementation of a particular policy. I use indicator variables (equal to one) to represent a state
in a particular quarter had a policy in place. If a particular policy was not implemented in a state at
a quarter, the corresponding policy variable would be zero for this state and quarter combination.
Table 2.1 shows changes in policies and regions where these policies were effective
between 2012 and 2018. It displays three core policies including e-cigarette taxes, cigarette taxes,
and e-cigarette packaging regulations. Moreover, I have calculated tax changes and tax rate levels
for e-cigarettes and cigarettes in the P.Tax regions and the V.Tax regions. All taxes and tax changes
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are adjusted with CPI to the level of 2018Q4 (the fourth quarter of 2018). In the P.Tax regions, the
average change of e-cigarette taxes is $1.543 per ml and the average change of cigarette taxes is
$0.597 per pack. Similarly, in V.Tax regions, the average change of e-cigarette taxes is $0.056 per
ml and the average change of cigarette taxes is $0.275 per pack.
Furthermore, a particular pod, like Juul, contains 0.7 ml of liquid. With this considered,
with tax changes included, the average tax rates for an e-cigarette pod and a pack of cigarettes
would be $1.080 and $1.978 (not including federal excise taxes for cigarettes) in P.Tax regions.
Similarly, the average tax rate for an e-cigarette pod would be $0.039, and that for a pack of
cigarettes would be $1.598. This shows that the average tax rates are higher for both e-cigarettes
and cigarettes in the P.Tax regions than in the V.Tax regions. The average changes in tax rates for
the two products are also higher in the P.Tax regions. That means e-cigarettes and cigarettes are
cheaper in V.Tax regions on the tax perspective. Additionally, from the tax perspective, e-cigarettes
are cheaper than cigarettes in all regions, and this tax gap is even larger in V.Tax regions.
The purchase data for tobacco-related product purchases in 2012-2018 are from the NCP
data collected from 48 states. Since C1, C2, and M1 imposed e-cigarette taxes at the local level, to
investigate the tax effects in these jurisdictions, I break down IL into three regions: C1, C2, and the
rest of the state (C3). Similarly, I separate M1 in Maryland from the rest of the state (M2). As such,
C3 and M2 would serve as control regions. The local and state jurisdictions compose 52 regions.
The NCP data provides household demographic characteristics including income, education,
whether the households have children, etc. This dataset contains approximately sixty thousand
American households annually. About 80% of the households continue participation in the
following year.
The tobacco products collected from the NCP data include cigarettes, e-cigarettes, and SCP
(nicotine patches/gums/tablets, etc.) from a variety of outlets such as convenience stores, drug
stores, and mass merchandisers. Among these purchases, e-cigarettes include all related products
such as disposable e-cigarettes, starter kits, and refill cartridges. The NCP data records purchase
information for each shopping trip. The amount of e-cigarette purchases is relatively trivial, so I
have aggregated the weekly purchase data for each household to the quarter level. Then, I have
created indicator variables to show whether a household purchased that product category, which is
cigarettes, e-cigarettes, or SCP, in each quarter. Furthermore, I have calculated the total quantity
number of a product that a household purchased over each quarter, specifically, cigarettes in packs,
e-cigarettes in units, and SCP in units.
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With the aggregation above, the full sample includes over 1.6 million household-quarter
observations from 117,817 households. From this full sample, I have extracted samples of “everpurchasers” which are households that have ever purchased the relevant product at least once from
2012 to 2018. In this way, I have generated samples of ever-purchasers respectively for cigarettes,
e-cigarettes, and SCP. In all households of the full sample, 21.4% (25,225 households) are everpurchasers of cigarettes, 2.0% (2,373 households) are ever-purchasers of e-cigarettes, and 3.1%
(3,636 households) are ever-purchasers of SCP. In a quarter, on average, approximately 8% of
households purchased cigarettes, 0.4% purchased e-cigarettes, and 0.6% purchased SCP. Table 2.2
shows the summary statistics of the full sample and samples of ever-purchasers regarding purchases
and corresponding policies.
Samples of ever-purchasers provide some insight into consumer behaviors. In terms of
ever-purchasers of e-cigarettes, about 80.9% of the households that have ever purchased ecigarettes purchased cigarettes, suggesting that cigarette purchases might be a strong predictor of
e-cigarette purchases. This is consistent with findings from Dutra and Glantz (2014): the use of ecigarettes is associated with higher odds of ever or current cigarette smoking. In contrast, 17.2% of
ever-purchasers of e-cigarettes purchased SCP. As to ever-purchasers of cigarettes, 9.4% of the
households purchased e-cigarettes and 8.8% of the households purchased SCP. Furthermore,
comparing ever-purchasers of cigarettes and e-cigarettes, the average number of cigarettes
purchased by ever-purchasers of e-cigarettes is about four times of that purchased by everpurchasers of cigarettes. This is consistent with results from Jorenby et al. (2017): dual users do
not smoke fewer cigarettes than smoke-only users. Additionally, regarding ever-purchasers of SCP,
60.8% of them purchased cigarettes and 13.9% of them purchased e-cigarettes.
Following the overview of ever-purchasers of the three products, I further break them down
into seven distinct groups without overlaps of one another in Figure 2.1. Policies may have different
effects on different groups so I would investigate heterogeneous effects of policies for these groups
in the section of heterogeneous effects. These groups represent differences in sourcing nicotine and
show in three types for purchases. The first type is single product purchasers. Of this type, group 1
is cigarette only purchasers, that means, these households did not purchase e-cigarettes nor SCP.
Similarly, group 2 is SCP only purchasers, and group 3 is e-cigarette only purchasers. The second
type is dual purchaser exclusive groups, which means they purchased the two indicated products
but did not purchase the third product. Group 4 is dual purchasers of cigarettes and SCP without ecigarette purchases. Similarly, group 5 is dual purchasers of cigarettes and e-cigarettes and group
6 is dual purchasers of e-cigarettes and SCP. The third type of purchaser is triple purchasers, i.e.,
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they are ever-purchasers of all three products. The respective numbers of households in group 1 to
group 7 are 21,092; 1,371; 503; 1,760; 1,924; 56; and 449.

2.4

Empirical Strategy
I match the policy data with the purchase data by quarters (in which purchases were made)

and residing regions of households. With this combined data, I estimate the causal effects of
policies on purchases of tobacco products. My policy focus is on e-cigarette taxes. The
identification strategy that I used is a generalized differences-in-differences strategy. In this
identification, treated households and treated quarters of time for e-cigarette taxes are households
in regions and quarters with changes in e-cigarette taxes while those households in regions or
quarters without changes serve as control households and control quarters. To measures the effects
of e-cigarette taxes on the treated households in the treated quarters against the untreated
households in the untreated quarters, I apply the identification strategy in two empirical models.
First, I estimate the policy effects on the probability that a household would purchase a
type of tobacco product in a linear probability model:
𝑗
𝑃൫𝐶ℎ𝑟𝑦𝑞
> 0൯ = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝐸𝑇𝑟𝑦𝑞 + 𝛼2 𝐶𝑇𝑟𝑦𝑞 + 𝛼3 𝑃𝑟𝑦𝑞 + 𝜷𝑿𝑟𝑦𝑞 + 𝜎ℎ + 𝜏𝑦𝑞 + 𝜀ℎ𝑟𝑦𝑞 (1),
𝑗

where 𝑃൫𝐶ℎ𝑟𝑦𝑞 > 0൯ is the purchase probability of tobacco product 𝑗 for household ℎ, in region r,
year 𝑦, and quarter 𝑞. Specifically, 𝑗 represents cigarettes, e-cigarettes, or SCP; 𝐸𝑇𝑟𝑦𝑞 is a

continuous variable reflecting the change of e-cigarette tax in region r, year 𝑦, and quarter 𝑞; 𝐶𝑇𝑟𝑦𝑞
is a change of cigarette excise taxes in region r, year 𝑦, and quarter 𝑞; all tax changes are adjusted
by CPI to the level of 2018Q4. 𝑃𝑟𝑦𝑞 indicates whether a region in a quarter has e-cigarette packaging
regulations. 𝑿𝑟𝑦𝑞 is a vector of the five other, observable policy covariates: whether a region in a

quarter requires licenses for over-the-counter sales of e-cigarettes, restricts sales of e-cigarettes to
minors, has an SFA law that restricts uses of e-cigarettes, has an SFA law that restricts uses of
cigarettes, and implements a Medicaid expansion; β is a vector of unknown parameters,
representing the average mean effects of each of these policies over time. Correspondingly, 𝛼1 and
𝛼2 represent the average mean effects of e-cigarette tax changes and cigarette tax changes.
Furthermore, 𝜎ℎ is household fixed-effects, 𝜏𝑦𝑞 is year-quarter or quarterly fixed-effects, and 𝜀ℎ𝑟𝑦𝑞
represents the unobserved error term. This specification clusters standard errors at the state level.
Second, I estimate the effects of these policies on the purchase quantities of each type of
𝑗

𝑗

tobacco product using a fixed-effects model, with 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶ℎ𝑟𝑦𝑞 replacing 𝑃൫𝐶ℎ𝑟𝑦𝑞 > 0൯ in equation
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𝑗

(1) as the dependent variable, where 𝐶ℎ𝑟𝑦𝑞 is the purchased quantity of tobacco product 𝑗 for
household ℎ resided in region r in year 𝑦 and quarter 𝑞; all independent variables are the same as
in equation (1). The purchased quantities are in logs because the magnitude of these is larger than
other variables. Box-cox tests support the logarithm transformation. The interpretation of tax effects
would be the percentage changes of purchased quantities by each additional dollar increased at the
mean. In both specifications42, household fixed-effects control for unobserved non-time varying

differences in demand across households. They might serve as better controls for unobservable
factors than broader geographic controls, such as county fixed-effects or state fixed-effects. I would
test the robustness of the results by replacing household fixed-effects with state or county fixedeffects in the robustness check section. Adding state-specific linear time trends creates collinearity
with the fixed-effects so they are not included in models.
Moreover, model (1) first uses all observed households to estimate purchase probabilities
of cigarettes, e-cigarettes, and SCP respectively, then it uses each ever-purchaser sample to estimate
the purchase probability for that same particular product category. With the same samples, the
second specification estimates the demand for these products. Regressions in the full sample and
ever-purchaser samples identify policy effects on demand of the pool of all consumers and everpurchasers for the three products. Aside from identifying the average policy effects of e-cigarette
taxes from both P.Tax and V.Tax, I extract two sub-samples—not in V.Tax regions and not in P.Tax
regions—respectively from all households in the full sample and the ever-purchasers for each

product. Using the sub-samples of not in the V.Tax regions, models measure the effects of P.Tax on
purchases; while applying the sub-samples of not in the P.Tax regions, models examine the effects
of V.Tax. These sub-sample regressions test if different scales of tax rates or types of e-cigarette
taxes have contrasting effects on purchase.

2.5

Results
This section shows the average policy effects on the purchase probability (extensive

margin) and the purchased quantity (intensive margin) of cigarettes, e-cigarettes, and SCP with a
generalized difference-in-differences approach.

42 To apply fixed effects, this article uses linear fixed effects estimators in model (1) instead of
Probit, Logit, Tobit, or Heckman, because applying fixed effects to other estimators would
reach biased results or is not applicable in panel data.
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2.5.1

Analysis of Extensive and Intensive Purchase Habits
Table 2.3 shows the results of regressions for purchase probabilities and purchase

quantities in six panels. In terms of e-cigarette taxes, the top panels show the average effects of all
e-cigarette taxes in all regions and all quarters, the middle panels exhibit the average effects of
P.Tax, while the bottom panels indicate the average effects of V.Tax. Individually speaking, panel
A1 displays the policy effects on purchase probabilities and amounts of cigarettes, e-cigarettes, and
SCP for all households. Panel A2 displays those for all households not in the V.Tax regions. Panel
A3 displays those for all households not in the P.Tax regions. Similarly, panels B1to B3
demonstrate the policy effects on the purchase of cigarettes, e-cigarettes, and SCP for the
corresponding ever-purchasers in all regions, not in the V.Tax regions, and not in the P.Tax regions.
Contrasting all three panels of A1 to A3, increases of cigarette taxes decrease purchase
probabilities and amounts of cigarettes, increases of e-cigarette taxes have positive effects on
purchase amounts of e-cigarettes, increases of e-cigarette taxes negatively influence purchase
probabilities and amounts of SCP, and implementations of e-cigarette packaging regulations
increase the purchase probabilities and amounts of SCP. In comparison, V.Tax in A3 positively
influences cigarette purchase probabilities and purchase amounts; it also increases purchase
probabilities of e-cigarettes, has larger positive effects on e-cigarette purchase amounts than those
of P.Tax in A2, as well as has larger negative effects on SCP purchase than those of P.Tax in A2.
Comparing panels of B1-B3 with panels of A1-A3, generally, the effects of policies have
larger magnitudes for ever-purchasers than the pool of all households, if they have statistically
significant effects on purchases. Moreover, e-cigarette taxes do not show any effects on purchase
amounts of e-cigarettes for the pool of all ever-purchasers of e-cigarettes nor those not in V.Tax
regions. Above all, it means that P.Tax does not increase purchases of cigarettes nor e-cigarettes
but negatively influence purchases of SCP. In comparison, V.Tax increases purchases of cigarettes
and e-cigarettes, as well as has larger negative effects on SCP purchases than P.Tax. Aside from
taxes and e-cigarette packing regulations, other policies mostly do not show statistically effects,
except e-cigarette SFA laws negatively influence SCP purchases of SCP ever-purchasers, cigarette
SFA laws negatively influence e-cigarette purchases of e-cigarette ever-purchasers, and
implementations of Medicaid expansion negatively affects cigarette purchase probabilities of
cigarette ever-purchasers.

36

2.5.2

Robustness Analysis
After the baseline regressions, I conduct a series of robustness checks using different model

specifications, focusing on the effect of e-cigarette taxes. Since e-cigarette taxes show statistically
significant results in all regressions in panel B3 of Table 2.3, using the same samples would provide
more evident results about robustness, so I show these results in Table 2.4. In the first robustness
check, the specification adds household characteristics, keeping everything else the same as in the
baseline regressions. These characteristics include household size, household income level,
whether having children under 18 years old, marital status, household access to the internet,
ethnicity, and characteristics regarding the male or female household head such as categories of
age group, education level, hours of employment, and occupation type. Results of e-cigarette taxes
in this specification are consistent with those in B3 of Table 2.3 (baseline specification) on the
statistical significance and magnitude of the estimates. In the second robustness check, with these
characteristics added but replacing the household fixed-effects with county fixed-effects, ecigarette taxes show similar results on cigarette purchase and SCP purchase but they do not show
statistically significant results on e-cigarette purchase anymore.
The third specification still adds the household characteristics but applies state fixedeffects; e-cigarette taxes do not have influences on cigarette purchase amounts nor e-cigarette
purchase (probabilities and amounts), compared with the baseline regression results. Removing the
household characteristics and replacing household fixed-effects with the county or state-fixed
effects show similar results as the above. Household characteristics do not vary much over time, so
adding them obtains similar results. Moreover, county fixed-effects or state fixed-effects slightly
change the results of e-cigarette purchase but neither of them controls for unobserved non-time
varying differences in demand across households.
Furthermore, instead of clustering at the state level, the fourth specification clusters
standard errors at the county level; results are consistent with that of the baseline regressions. In
another specification, replacing continuous changes of e-cigarette taxes with an indicator of ecigarette tax changes, e-cigarette taxes do not show statistically significant results on e-cigarette
purchase nor SCP purchase. This indicates that there might be differences in the average effects
and marginal effects of e-cigarette tax changes reflected by the indicator and the continuous change
variable. Moreover, using continuous e-cigarette tax changes (2012-2017) that I obtained from the
Nielsen Retail Scanner Data, the last specification shows similar results as those of the baseline
regressions. This resolves the concern of potential measurement errors for e-cigarette taxes resulted
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from fewer products purchased or different product compositions for households in the household
panel. Additionally, I have also conducted similar robustness checks for other panels of regressions
in Table 2.3; results of those are similar as the above if e-cigarette taxes show statistically
significant results in the original specifications of Table 2.3; e-cigarette taxes keep non-statistical
significance in the robustness check results if they are not statistically significant in the original
specifications. Lastly, replacing e-cigarette purchase amounts in units with mls, the results are
consistent though the magnitude is slightly larger (not shown in table).

2.6

Heterogeneous Effects
Table 2.5 examines whether heterogeneity exists in the e-cigarette tax effects across

different subgroups of ever-purchasers of the three products based on Figure 2.1. Compared with
B1-B3 in Table 2.3, instead of using all ever-purchasers in the regressions for purchases of the
corresponding product, regressions in Table 2.5 examine purchases of all three products by each of
the seven subgroups. The purpose is to test if subgroups respond differently to tax changes. The
results of these regressions can provide insights into understanding heterogeneous purchase
behaviors and evidence for policy implications. Generally, the results in the table show that
subgroups behave differently: some subgroups show statistically significant responses while their
counterpart groups do not, or subgroups show different magnitudes of responses if estimates are
statistically significant for these compared subgroups.
In terms of cigarette purchase, cigarette only purchasers do not respond to changes in ecigarette taxes in rows (1)-(3) of Table 2.5. Dual purchasers of cigarettes and e-cigarettes do not
respond either in rows (13)-(15). Dual purchasers of cigarettes and SCP increase purchase
probabilities of cigarettes in response to P.Tax (row (11)); such dual purchasers increase both
purchase probabilities and amounts of cigarettes in response to V.Tax (row (12)). Triple purchasers
of the three products increase both purchase probabilities and amounts of cigarettes in response to
V.Tax (row (21)).
About e-cigarette purchase, in response to V.Tax, e-cigarette only purchasers, dual
purchasers of cigarettes and e-cigarettes, as well as dual purchasers of e-cigarettes and SCP increase
e-cigarette purchases in rows (9), (15), (18). In comparison, triple purchasers of the three products
decrease e-cigarette purchases in response to V.Tax (row (21)). Regarding SCP purchase, in
response to P.Tax, SCP only purchasers decrease SCP purchases in rows (5). Responding to V.Tax,
dual purchasers of cigarettes and SCP, dual purchasers of e-cigarettes and SCP, and triple
purchasers of the three products decrease SCP purchases in rows (12), (18), (21).

38

Since the size of the subgroup of cigarette only purchasers is broad, to further investigate
the heterogeneous effects, I further break purchases of these ever-purchasers into three groups:
pack-a-day purchase, intermediate purchase, and occasional purchase (less than a half pack a day
purchase on average). Results indicate that these cigarette only purchasers reduce amounts of packa-day purchase in response to P.Tax (row (23)), but increase occasional cigarette purchases in
response to P.Tax (row (30)). Similarly, I also break down cigarette purchases of other subgroups
(results not shown in table): triple purchasers, dual purchasers of cigarettes and SCP, and dual
purchasers of cigarettes and e-cigarettes. In most cases, P.Tax does not influence cigarette
purchases; if it does, P.Tax is likely to increase occasional purchases and reduces intermediate
purchases. In comparison, V.Tax mostly has statistically significant effects on cigarette purchases:
it is likely to increase occasional cigarette purchases but decrease intermediate and pack-a-day
purchases.
To sum up, results indicate that P.Tax bearly influences purchases of the three products at
least does not increase sales of e-cigarettes for any of the users who use e-cigarettes. Occasionally,
P.Tax influences other subgroups who do not purchase e-cigarettes: it increases occasional cigarette
purchases but decreases intermediate purchases of dual purchasers of cigarettes and SCP; it
decreases SCP purchases of SCP only purchasers. In comparison, V.Tax influences purchases of
the three products in most of the subgroups except for SCP only purchasers. Specifically, V.Tax
influences cigarette purchases mostly by increasing occasional cigarette purchases but decreasing
intermediate and pack-a-day purchases. For those who use e-cigarettes, V.Tax increases e-cigarette
purchases but does not increase purchases of the other two products, except for the triple purchasers
who decrease purchases of e-cigarette and SCP, as well as pack-a-day and intermediate cigarette
purchases but increase occasional cigarette purchases.

2.7

Conclusions
I use detailed household purchase data to examine the policy effects of e-cigarette taxes

from 2012 to 2018. The investigation controls for purchase changes caused by related policies and
regulations including cigarette excise taxes, e-cigarette packaging regulations, the requirement of
licensure for e-cigarette OTC sales, restrictions of e-cigarette sales to minors, SFA laws that restrict
uses of e-cigarettes, SFA laws that restrict uses of cigarettes, and implementation of Medicaid
expansion.
The policy focus is on e-cigarette taxes. In the investigation time interval, jurisdictions
implemented two types of e-cigarette-taxes: ad valorem taxes (P.Tax) and specific excise taxes
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(V.Tax). P.Tax is based on a percentage of the wholesale or retail price while V.Tax is collected
according to the liquid volume contained in the product. Regions with P.Tax (V.Tax) implemented
are P.Tax (V.Tax) regions. Regions that are not P.Tax (V.Tax) regions are the control regions and
the V.Tax (P.Tax) regions. The tax rates for e-cigarettes and cigarettes are both lower in the V.Tax
regions than in the P.Tax regions. The tax rates for e-cigarettes are lower than cigarettes in all
regions; V.Tax regions have the largest tax gap between e-cigarettes and cigarettes.
Regarding policy effects on ever-purchasers’ purchase on corresponding products, on
average, e-cigarette taxes do not influence cigarette purchases while decrease SCP purchases.
Comparing the effects of two types of e-cigarette taxes, P.Tax does not increase purchases of
cigarettes nor e-cigarettes but negatively influences purchases of SCP; V.Tax increases purchases
of cigarettes and e-cigarettes, as well as has larger negative effects on SCP purchases than P.Tax.
As to the effects of other policies and regulations, cigarette excise taxes decrease cigarette
purchases, e-cigarette packaging regulations increase SCP purchases, e-cigarette SFA laws
negatively influence SCP purchases, cigarette SFA laws have negative effects on e-cigarette
purchases, and implementations of Medicaid expansion decrease cigarette purchase probabilities.
Moreover, I conduct a series of robustness checks and obtain robust results.
Aside from the main results above, I conduct investigations of heterogeneous effects of ecigarette taxes on the seven subgroups of ever-purchasers: cigarette only purchasers, SCP only
purchasers, e-cigarette only purchasers, dual purchasers of cigarettes and SCP, dual purchasers of
cigarettes and e-cigarettes, dual purchasers of e-cigarettes and SCP, and triple purchasers of the
three products. Meanwhile, I compare the effects of P.Tax and V.Tax. Results indicate that these
subgroups respond differently to P.Tax and V.Tax. From the perspective of tobacco control, it
seems that V.Tax brings negative health effects to e-cigarette only purchasers, dual purchasers of
cigarettes and e-cigarettes, and dual purchasers of e-cigarettes and SCP by increasing e-cigarette
purchases if e-cigarettes are considered with health risks. It seems that V.Tax does not cause health
concerns to other subgroups of purchasers; P.Tax does not cause health concerns to any subgroups
of purchasers.
The different effects of P.Tax and V.Tax are probably because of the different tax rates of
e-cigarettes and cigarettes in the P.Tax and V.Tax regions. As the gap between e-cigarette taxes
and cigarette taxes is larger in the V.Tax regions than in the P.Tax regions, in most cases,
households in the V.Tax regions are likely to increase e-cigarette purchases if they are e-cigarette
purchasers. These results suggest that implementing e-cigarette taxes at a higher rate, at least as the
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average rate of P.Tax and without making the rates higher than tax rates for cigarettes, probably
can curb e-cigarette purchases without increasing cigarette purchases.
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Table 2.1 Summary of Core Policies Related to Cigarettes and E-Cigarettes by Year
Changes in E-Cigarette Taxes ($/ml)
Year
Num. States w/ Changes
Average Nominal Change
States with E-Cigarette
Taxes
2012
1
$1.025
MN
2013
1
$1.909
MN
2014
1
$2.840
MN
2015
4
$2.221
MN, NC, DC, LA,
2016
6
$2.303
MN, DC, NC, LA, WV, PA
2017
8
$2.364
MN, DC, NC, LA, WV, PA,
CA, KS
2018
10
$2.626
MN, DC, NC, LA, WV, PA,
CA, KS, DE, NJ
Changes in Cigarette Excise Taxes ($/pack)
Year
Num. States w/ Changes
Average Nominal Changes States with Cigarette Excise
Tax Changes
2012
9
$1.070
CT, NH, NM, NY, RI, SC,
UT, VT, WA
2013
11
$1.124
CT, NH, NM, NY, RI, SC,
UT, VT, WA, MA, MN
2014
12
$1.139
CT, NH, NM, NY, RI, SC,
UT, VT, WA, MA, MN, OR
2015
17
$1.111
CT, NH, NM, NY, RI, SC,
UT, VT, WA, MA, MN, OR,
AL, KS, LA, NV, OH
2016
19
$1.073
CT, NH, NM, NY, RI, SC,
UT, VT, WA, MA, MN, OR,
AL, KS, LA, NV, OH, WV,
PA
2017
20
$1.089
CT, NH, NM, NY, RI, SC,
UT, VT, WA, MA, MN, OR,
AL, KS, LA, NV, OH, WV,
PA, CA
2018
23
$1.105
CT, NH, NM, NY, RI, SC,
UT, VT, WA, MA, MN, OR,
AL, KS, LA, NV, OH, WV,
PA, CA, DC, KY, OK
E-Cigarette Packaging Regulations
Year Num. States w/ Policy
States with E-Cigarette Packaging Regulations
2014 4
MN, NY, OH, SD
2015 19
MN, NY, OH, SD, AR, IL, ID, MA, MO, NM, NC, ND,
OR, RI, TX, UT, VT, VA, WY
2016 24
MN, NY, OH, SD, AR, IL, ID, MA, MO, NM, NC, ND,
OR, RI, TX, UT, VT, VA, WY, ME, NJ, PA, TN, WA
2017 25
MN, NY, OH, SD, AR, IL, ID, MA, MO, NM, NC, ND,
OR, RI, TX, UT, VT, VA, WY, ME, NJ, PA, TN, WA, NH,
Source: CDC’s STATE System, the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, and the Public Health Law
Center. Timespan is 2012 to 2018. Policy changes are relative to the year 2009. Some states had
multiple tax changes in the timespan. No states had e-cigarette packaging regulations before 2014,
and there were no newly added states for changes in 2018.
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Table 2.2 Summary Statistics
Variables
Dependent Variables

Full Sample
(N= 1,625,911)
Mean

Std. Dev.

Cigarettes
(N= 378,332)
Mean

Std. Dev.

Samples of Ever-Purchasers
E-Cigarettes
(N= 50,606)
Mean

Std. Dev.

Mean

SCP
(N= 63,413)
Std. Dev.

Any Cigarette Purchase (Yes)
0.084 0.277
0.360
0.480
0.495
0.500
0.315
0.464
Any E-Cigarette Purchase (Yes)
0.004 0.061
0.013
0.114
0.119
0.324
0.020
0.140
Any SCP Purchase (Yes)
0.006 0.077
0.015
0.120
0.027
0.161
0.152
0.359
Number of Cigarette Purchase (packs)
3.266 19.821
14.037
39.208
27.856
55.961
14.592
40.414
Number of E-Cigarette Purchase (units)
0.054 2.127
0.170
3.564
1.743
11.936
0.371
5.7891
Number of SCP Purchase (units)
1.882 45.213
3.317
56.358
6.450
77.442
48.244
224.004
Policy Variables
Changes in E-Cigarette Taxes ($/ml)
0.264 1.221
0.245
1.182
0.201
1.045
0.309
1.359
Changes in Cigarette Excise Taxes ($/pack) 0.360 0.658
0.315
0.618
0.304
0.602
0.332
0.625
E-Cigarette Packaging Regulations (Yes)
0.267 0.442
0.257
0.437
0.256
0.437
0.281
0.450
Retail Licensure on E-Cigarettes (Yes)
0.113 0.317
0.105
0.306
0.102
0.302
0.114
0.318
E-Cigarette Restrictions on Sales to Minors
0.568 0.495
0.565
0.496
0.567
0.496
0.587
0.492
(Yes)
E-Cigarette SFA Laws (Yes)
0.081 0.273
0.066
0.249
0.061
0.240
0.058
0.234
Cigarette SFA Laws (Yes)
0.683 0.465
0.663
0.473
0.663
0.473
0.667
0.471
Medicaid Cover Tobacco (Yes)
0.420 0.494
0.402
0.490
0.407
0.491
0.414
0.493
C. Ecig Taxes Not in V.Tax Regions ($/ml) 0.287 1.281
C. Cig Taxes Not in V.Tax Regions ($/pack) 0.369
0.655
C. Ecig Taxes Not in P.Tax Regions ($/ml) 0.007 0.097
C. Cig Taxes Not in P.Tax Regions ($/pack) 0.312
0.598
Source: Author’s calculations for data from the Nielsen Consumer Panel Data, the CDC STATE System, state government websites, and others. Note:
Timespan is 2012 through 2018. Summary statistics are for all households or all ever-purchasers of a particular product. Changes in e-cigarette taxes
and cigarette taxes are compared to 2009; all taxes are inflation-adjusted by CPI to the level of 2018Q4. SCP denotes smoking-cessation products. Ecig
means e-cigarette. C. means changes in.

43

Table 2.3 Results of Purchase Probability and Purchase Amount
Panel A1 (Sample: All HHs in All Regions)
Cig Purchase
Ecig Purchase
Probability Amount
Probability Amount
Changes in Ecig
0.0001
0.001
0.0001
0.002*
Taxes ($/ml)
(0.0004)
(0.005)
(0.0001)
(0.001)

SCP Purchase
Probability Amount
-0.0002**
-0.003***
(0.0001)
(0.001)

Changes in Cig
Taxes ($/pack)

-0.003*
(0.002)

-0.052**
(0.024)

0.0001
(0.0003)

0.001
(0.004)

0.0003
(0.0003)

0.005
(0.005)

Ecig Packaging
Regulations (Yes)
Observations

NS

NS

NS

NS

1,624,373

1,624,373

1,624,373

1,624,373

0.0008***
(0.0003)
1,624,373

0.013***
(0.004)
1,624,373

Panel A2 (Sample: All HHs Not in V.Tax Regions)
Cig Purchase
Ecig Purchase
Probability Amount
Probability Amount
Changes in Ecig
0.0002
0.002
0.0001
0.002*
Taxes ($/ml)
(0.0004)
(0.005)
(0.0001)
(0.001)

SCP Purchase
Probability Amount
-0.0001*
(0.0001)

-0.002*
(0.001)

Changes in Cig
Taxes ($/pack)

-0.004**
(0.002)

-0.062**
(0.030)

0.0001
(0.0003)

0.001
(0.004)

0.0002
(0.0003)

0.003
(0.005)

Ecig Packaging
Regulations (Yes)
Observations

NS

NS

NS

NS

1,465,147

1,465,147

1,465,147

1,465,147

0.0009***
(0.0003)
1,465,147

0.016***
(0.004)
1,465,147

Panel A3 (Sample: All HHs Not in P.Tax Regions)
Cig Purchase
Ecig Purchase
Probability Amount
Probability Amount
Changes in Ecig
0.002***
0.029***
0.0005*** 0.007***
Taxes ($/ml)
(0.001)
(0.010)
(0.0002)
(0.002)

SCP Purchase
Probability Amount
-0.0007*** -0.012***
(0.0002)
(0.003)

Changes in Cig
Taxes ($/pack)

-0.00002
(0.0005)

-0.008***
(0.003)

-0.110***
(0.040)

0.0002
(0.0005)

0.002
(0.007)

0.00001
(0.008)

Ecig Packaging
NS
NS
NS
NS
0.0006**
0.010***
Regulations (Yes)
(0.0002)
(0.004)
Observations
1,352,022 1,352,022 1,352,022 1,352,022 1,352,022
1,352,022
Source: Author’s calculations from the Nielsen Consumer Panel Data and policies. Timespan is 20122018. Regressions are purchase probabilities and amounts of a product by all households. Compared
to A1, A2 removes households who resided in the V.Tax regions, and A3 deletes those who were in
the P.Tax regions. Regressions include household fixed-effects (FE) and year by quarter time FE.
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by state. NS means not statistically significant;
results are not displayed. Levels of statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 2.3 Results of Purchase Probability and Purchase Amount (Continued)
Panel B1 (Sample: Ever-Purchasers in All Regions)
Cig Purchase
Ecig Purchase
SCP Purchase
Probability Amount
Probability Amount
Probability Amount
Changes in Ecig
0.001
0.012
0.004
0.066
-0.005***
-0.080***
Taxes ($/ml)
(0.002)
(0.025)
(0.003)
(0.048)
(0.001)
(0.023)
Changes in Cig
Taxes ($/pack)

-0.013**
(0.006)

-0.204**
(0.087)

0.005
(0.010)

0.056
(0.130)

0.004
(0.008)

0.073
(0.124)

Ecig Packaging
Regulations (Yes)
Observations

NS

NS

NS

NS

378,103

378,103

50,595

50,595

0.018***
(0.006)
63,393

0.291***
(0.091)
63,393

Panel B2 (Sample: Ever-Purchasers Not in V.Tax Regions)
Cig Purchase
Ecig Purchase
Probability Amount
Probability Amount
Changes in Ecig
0.001
0.018
0.004
0.061
Taxes ($/ml)
(0.002)
(0.027)
(0.003)
(0.046)

SCP Purchase
Probability Amount
-0.004**
-0.065**
(0.002)
(0.025)

Changes in Cig
Taxes ($/pack)

-0.015**
(0.008)

-0.246**
(0.107)

0.006
(0.011)

0.081
(0.149)

0.0003
(0.009)

0.006
(0.145)

Ecig Packaging
Regulations (Yes)
Observations

NS

NS

NS

NS

338,997

338,997

45,630

45,630

0.020***
(0.006)
57,978

0.342***
(0.092)
57,978

Panel B3 (Sample: Ever-Purchasers Not in P.Tax Regions)
Cig Purchase
Ecig Purchase
Probability Amount
Probability Amount
Changes in Ecig
0.010**
0.114**
0.014***
0.199***
Taxes ($/ml)
(0.004)
(0.056)
(0.004)
(0.048)

SCP Purchase
Probability Amount
-0.018***
-0.306***
(0.005)
(0.073)

Changes in Cig
Taxes ($/pack)

-0.001
(0.010)

-0.028***
(0.009)

-0.407***
(0.131)

0.008
(0.015)

0.103
(0.202)

0.016
(0.158)

Ecig Packaging
NS
NS
NS
NS
0.016***
0.262***
Regulations (Yes)
(0.005)
(0.088)
Observations
317,501
317,501
43,572
43,572
53,439
53,439
Source: Author’s calculations from the Nielsen Consumer Panel Data and policies. Timespan is 20122018. Ever-purchasers are households that purchased the particular product at least once. Regressions
are purchase amounts of a product by the ever-purchasers of the corresponding product. Regressions
include household fixed-effects (FE) and year by quarter time FE. Robust standard errors in
parentheses are clustered by state. NS means not statistically significant; results are not displayed.
Levels of statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 2.4 Robustness Estimates (Ever-Purchasers Not in P.Tax Regions)

Effects of E-Cigarette Taxes ($/ml)
Add HH Charicteristics (HH Fixed Effects)
N
Add HH Charicteristics (County Fixed
Effects)
N
Add HH Charicteristics (State Fixed
Effects)

Cig Ever-Purchasers

Ecig Ever-Purchasers

SCP Ever-Purchasers

Cig Purchase

Ecig Purchase

SCP Purchase

Probability
0.010**
(0.004)
317,501
0.048***

Amount
0.120**
(0.058)
317,501
0.705***

Probability
0.016***
(0.004)
43,572
-0.001

Amount
0.215***
(0.056)
43,572
-0.037

Probability
-0.017***
(0.005)
53,439
-0.059***

Amount
-0.289***
(0.076)
53,439
-1.031***

(0.013)
317,686
0.007*

(0.202)
317,686
0.067

(0.008)
43,581
-0.001

(0.112)
43,581
-0.001

(0.011)
53,456
-0.029***

(0.199)
53,456
-0.487***

(0.004)
(0.053)
(0.005)
(0.006)
(0.005)
(0.082)
N
317,686
317,686
43,801
43,801
53,456
53,456
Standard Errors Clustered at County
0.010**
0.114
0.014***
0.199**
-0.018***
-0.306***
(0.005)
(0.070)
(0.004)
(0.058)
(0.005)
(0.078)
N
317,501
317,501
43,572
43,572
53,439
53,439
E-Cigarette Tax Indicator (Yes)
0.012**
0.182**
0.009
0.124
0.007
0.085
(0.005)
(0.072)
(0.007)
(0.085)
(0.012)
(0.201)
N
317,501
317,501
43,572
43,572
53,439
53,439
E-Cigarette Tax Based on Nielsen
0.015***
0.147***
0.015***
0.185***
-0.022***
-0.351***
Retail Scanner Data (2012-2017)
(0.003)
(0.045)
(0.003)
(0.046)
(0.004)
(0.060)
N
277,942
277,942
38,366
38,366
46,571
46,571
Source: Author’s calculations from the Nielsen Consumer Panel Data and policies. Timespan is 2012-2018. Ever-purchasers are households that purchased the
particular product at least once. Regressions are purchase amounts of a product by the ever-purchasers of the corresponding product. All regressions include
household and year by quarter fixed-effects. Unless indicated, regressions do not control for household characteristics. State-specific linear time trends are not
included because of redundancy with the two-way fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by state or county are in parentheses. Levels of statistical
significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.5 Heterogeneity Estimates
Heterogeneity Estimates for
Effects of E-Cigarette Taxes
(1) Cig Only Purchasers
in All Regions
N
(2) Cig Only Purchasers
Not in V.Tax Regions
N
(3) Cig Only Purchasers
Not in P.Tax Regions
N
(4) SCP Only Purchasers
in All Regions
N
(5) SCP Only Purchasers
Not in V.Tax Regions
N
(6) SCP Only Purchasers
Not in P.Tax Regions
N
(7) Ecig Only Purchasers
in All Regions
N
(8) Ecig Only Purchasers
Not in V.Tax Regions
N
(9) Ecig Only Purchasers
Not in P.Tax Regions
N
(10) Dual Purchasers of Cig & SCP
No Ecig in All Regions
N
(11) Dual Purchasers of Cig & SCP
No Ecig Not in V.Tax Regions
N
(12) Dual Purchasers of Cig & SCP
No Ecig Not in P.Tax Regions
N
(13) Dual Purchasers of Cig & Ecig
No SCP in All Regions
N
(14) Dual Purchasers of Cig & Ecig
No SCP Not in V.Tax Regions
N
(15) Dual Purchasers of Cig & Ecig
No SCP Not in P.Tax Regions
N

Cigarette Purchase
Probability Amount
0.001
0.010
(0.002)
(0.030)
304,964
304,964
0.001
0.017
(0.002)
(0.032)
273,029
273,029
0.006
0.066
(0.005)
(0.076)
254,843
254,843
/
/

E-Cigarette Purchase
Probability Amount
/
/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

/

0.009*
(0.005)
7,466
0.005
(0.005)
6,661
1.150***
(0.201)
6,493
/

0.007
(0.004)
31,112
0.008*
(0.004)
28,056
0.026***
(0.009)
26,512
-0.011
(0.007)
32,763
-0.012
(0.007)
29,284
0.001
(0.008)
28,371

0.089
(0.065)
31,112
0.102
(0.066)
28,056
0.354***
(0.130)
26,512
-0.153
(0.102)
32,763
-0.162
(0.104)
29,284
0.038
(0.123)
28,371
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SCP Purchase
Probability Amount
/
/

0.131*
(0.068)
7,466
0.085
(0.064)
6,661
14.660***
(2.742)
6,493
/

/

/

/

/

0.004
(0.004)
32,763
0.004
(0.004)
29,284
0.020***
(0.005)
28,371

0.073
(0.055)
32,763
0.067
(0.055)
29,284
0.299***
(0.065)
28,371

-0.007***
(0.002)
21,915
-0.008***
(0.003)
20,237
-0.014
(0.012)
18,219
/

-0.120***
(0.037)
21,915
-0.123***
(0.040)
20,237
-0.322
(0.198)
18,219
/

/

/

/

/

-0.003
(0.002)
31,112
-0.002
(0.002)
28,056
-0.005
(0.004)
26,512
/

-0.041
(0.034)
31,112
-0.026
(0.033)
28,056
-0.120**
(0.061)
26,512
/

/

/

/

/

Table 2.5 Heterogeneity Estimates (Continued)
Heterogeneity Estimates for Effects
of E-Cigarette Taxes
(16) Dual Purchasers of Ecig & SCP
No Cig in All Regions
N
(17) Dual Purchasers of Ecig & SCP
No Cig Not in V.Tax Regions
N
(18) Dual Purchasers of Ecig & SCP
No Cig Not in P.Tax Regions
N
(19) Triple-Purchasers of Cig &
Ecig & SCP in All Regions
N
(20) Triple-Purchasers
Not in V.Tax Regions
N
(21) Triple-Purchasers
Not in P.Tax Regions
N
(22) Cig Only Pack-a-Day
in All Regions
N
(23) Cig Only Pack-a-Day
Not in V.Tax Regions
N
(24) Cig Only Pack-a-Day
Not in P.Tax Regions
N
(25) Cig Only Intermediate
in All Regions
N
(26) Cig Only Intermediate
Not in V.Tax Regions
N
(27) Cig Only Intermediate
Not in P.Tax Regions
N
(28) Cig Only Occasional
in All Regions
N
(29) Cig Only Occasional
Not in V.Tax Regions
N
(30) Cig Only Occasional
Not in P.Tax Regions
N

Cigarette Purchase
Probabil
Amount
ity
/
/

/

/

/

/

0.010
(0.006)
9,264
0.006
(0.006)
8,628
0.118**
*
(0.019)
7,775
/

/

/

/

/

/

0.0004
(0.002)
280,104
0.001
(0.002)
250,769
0.008**
(0.004)
233,190

0.143
(0.094)
9,264
0.100
(0.091)
8,628
1.484***
(0.305)
7,775
-0.032***
(0.004)
10,752
-0.033***
(0.005)
9,709
-0.014
(0.012)
9,376
-0.004
(0.004)
11,908
-0.002
(0.004)
10,631
-0.006
(0.006)
10,337
0.003
(0.031)
280,104
0.004
(0.033)
250,769
0.102**
(0.049)
233,190
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E-Cigarette Purchase

SCP Purchase

Probability

Amount

Probability

Amount

-0.003
(0.009)
1,102
-0.017
(0.013)
1,057
0.081***
(0.015)
933
0.002
(0.007)
9,264
0.003
(0.007)
8,628
-0.070***

-0.054
(0.123)
1,102
-0.236
(0.191)
1,057
1.089***
(0.216)
933
0.022
(0.090)
9,264
0.040
(0.089)
8,628
-1.020***

-0.011
(0.025)
1,102
-0.001
(0.024)
1,057
-0.111***
(0.029)
933
-0.007
(0.005)
9,264
-0.004
(0.005)
8,628
-0.038***

-0.151
(0.398)
1,102
-0.018
(0.393)
1,057
-1.607***
(0.446)
933
-0.133*
(0.072)
9,264
-0.078
(0.074)
8,628
-0.621*
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7,775
/
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/

/
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Table 2.5 Heterogeneity Estimates (Continued)
Source: Author’s calculations from the Nielsen Consumer Panel dataset and policies from the CDC
STATE database and state government websites. Timespan is 2012-2018. Purchasers are households
that have purchased the particular product at least once. Cig means cigarettes; Ecig stands for ecigarettes; SCP refers to smoking-cessation products. All regressions include household fixed effects
(FE) and year by quarter time FE. Robust standard errors clustered by the state are in parentheses.
Levels of statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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1: Cig Only Purchasers
2: SCP Only Purchasers
3: Ecig Only Purchasers
4: Dual Purchasers of Cig & SCP but No Ecig
5: Dual Purchasers of Cig & Ecig but No SCP
6: Dual Purchasers of Ecig & SCP but No Cig
7: Triple Purchasers of Cig & Ecig & SCP

Figure 2.1 Dissection of Purchases by Ever-Purchasers of the Three Products

Source: Author’s calculations of purchase data from the Nielsen Consumer Panel Data.
Note: Cig denotes cigarettes. Ecig refers to e-cigarettes. SCP symbolizes smoking-cessation
products. N denotes the number of observations for the household by quarter combinations.
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CHAPTER 3. AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF E-CIGARETTE ADDICTION
3.1

Introduction
Most e-cigarettes contain nicotine, a highly addictive substance (U.S. Department of

Health and Human Services, 2016). Nicotine is also toxic and harmful, especially for youth and
pregnant women. However, e-cigarettes are the most commonly used tobacco product among youth
now. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2020a), about one in three high
school students reported current e-cigarette use in 2019; average monthly sales of e-cigarettes
increased 122 percent from 2014 to 2020 as price falls. It is of interest to ask whether the addictive
nature of this relatively new tobacco product is apparent addictive from data on consumption.
Becker and Murphy (1988) propose a rational addiction model incorporating the influences
of past and current consumption for lifetime utility-maximizing consumers. In their model, past
consumption is reinforcing for addictive goods: high levels of past consumption reinforces the
desire for current consumption and increases the marginal utility of current consumption. Their
model also indicates that consumers are rational or forward-looking in that they anticipate the
expected future consequences of their current actions. This feature differs their model from myopic
models of addictive behavior which ignoring the effect of future consumption when consumers
make consumption decisions. Therefore, the rational addiction model of Becker and Murphy (1988)
suggests that the consumption of an addictive good will depend on both future and past
consumptions.

It

has

the inter-temporal,

dependent

demand structure or

“adjacent

complementarity” (Ryder and Heal, 1973). This rational addiction model is also a type of the
rational choice model (Calvert, 1985), which focuses on the dynamics of current consumption in
response to future prices of addictive goods.
Tests of addiction have been applied to several different goods. However, there is no
research investigating the role of addiction in influencing the demand for e-cigarettes. Since most
e-cigarettes contain nicotine, a highly addictive substance, it is worth evaluating how addiction to
e-cigarettes influences the demand. Thus, this essay aims to fill the literature gap. Evidence from
this research can facilitate policymakers’ decisions on regulating the consumption of e-cigarettes
and provide evidence to address concerns of public health.
Regarding empirical research on addiction, several researchers test cigarette addiction and
find evidence of that. Among them, using aggregated state-level yearly purchase data in 1955-1985
and fixed-effects two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimations, Becker and Murphy (1994) reach an
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estimate of -0.78 for the long-run price elasticity of cigarette consumption and an estimate of -0.44
for the short-run price elasticity. With similar data, Baltagi and Griffin (2001) revisit the estimation
of Becker and Murphy (1994) but use a forward-filter first-difference 2SLS and a generalized
method of moment estimator. They find evidence that is consistent with rational addiction but reach
different estimates from different estimators: the short-run price elasticity ranges between -0.28
and -0.86 and the long-run price elasticity varies from -0.56 to -2.55. Instead of using aggregated
data, Chaloupka (1991) applies a micro data set and finds a long-run price elasticity of cigarette
consumption ranging between -0.48 and -0.27.
Other researchers also evaluate cigarette taxation and demand using a dynamic model that
incorporates consumers’ rational addiction. For example, Gordon and Sun (2015) use Nielsen
Household Panel Data from two submarkets in a large Midwestern city over 118 weeks; they reach
a long-run price elasticity of cigarette consumption at -0.63 and a short-run price elasticity of -0.35.
Sung et al. (1994) investigate the effects of cigarette taxes on cigarette yearly consumption of 11
western states and find evidence of rational addiction; they obtain a short-run demand elasticity of
-0.40 and an estimate of -0.48 for the long-run demand elasticity. The results of these articles show
that a model incorporating addiction is valid and a tax-increase reduces consumption more in the
long-run than in the short-run.
Moreover, researchers have also empirically analyzed rational addiction to other goods in
numerous research. For example, Grossman and Chaloupka (1998) show evidence of rational
addiction to cocaine by young adults and find an estimate of −1.35 for the long-run price elasticity
of consumption. On alcohol rational addiction, Baltagi and Griffin (2002) get a short-run price
elasticity of -0.10 and a long-run price elasticity of -1.24; Grossman et al. (1998) show that alcohol
is less addictive than are cigarettes, and they get an average short-run price elasticity of -0.41 and
an average long-run price elasticity of -0.65. Additionally, Olekalns and Bardsley (1996) test
caffeine addiction in coffee consumption; Cameron (1999) has examined rational addiction and the
demand for cinema; Cawley (2000) examines the rational addiction to calorie consumption
regarding eating patterns; Mobilia (1993) provides evidence of rational addiction in gambling;
Kwon et al. (2016) suggest that consumers are rationally addicted to mobile social apps. Richards
et al. (2007) show evidence of carbohydrate addiction.
Many of this literature uses ordinary least squares (OLS) and fixed-effects 2SLS methods
to estimate aggregate data. In comparison, the results of 2SLS are more variable than the OLS
estimates. Although typically the coefficients on the lag and lead of consumption are positive, some
specifications present negative or not statistically significant coefficient estimates for past and
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future consumptions. This might be due to the good is not addictive or consumers cannot anticipate
future price movements. Lastly, estimates of the discount factor are highly variable and in some
cases negative.
This essay uses Nielsen Retail Scanner Data for weekly e-cigarette purchases throughout
2012-2017 in each region43. The purchase data are used to approximate the consumption of a
representative consumer. This limitation may affect the generalization of the results. This essay
starts with a myopic model to test addiction and shows that consumers are addicted to e-cigarettes.
Then, with a forward-looking model, this essay finds evidence that consumers consider the future
for their current e-cigarette consumption. With this evidence, I test both the elements of addiction
and rationality in a rational model using the strategy of fixed-effects 2SLS. In the estimations, I
compare results of OLS with 2SLS using different sets of IVs, including policies, prices, and taxes.
Results in all these models are consistent with the rational model predictions. I reach a short-run
price elasticity of demand around -1.05 and a long-run price elasticity estimate of -1.50 from the
2SLS estimations. These results could not provide a precise estimate for the discount factor,
nevertheless, I show that restricting the discount factor to different numbers would not influence
estimates of the elasticities. Additionally, compared to cigarette addiction, I find evidence that ecigarettes are less addictive.
The rest of this essay presents as follows. The next section introduces the theory behind
the model and the model specification in my empirical analysis. The data section explains the data
source and variables in the model. The last two sections review the results and conclude the essay.

3.2

Model Specification
According to the nature of addiction, consumption is dynamic. Utility in the current period

depends on the consumption in the same period and that in the previous period. Following Becker,
Grossman, & Murphy (1994) (BGM), the consumer’s problem is to maximize the lifetime utility
𝑡−1
max ∑∞
U(𝑌𝑡 , 𝐶𝑡 , 𝐶𝑡−1 , 𝑒𝑡 )
𝑡=1 𝛽
𝑡−1 (
such that 𝐶0 = 𝐶 0 and ∑∞
𝑌𝑡 + 𝑃𝑡 𝐶𝑡 ) = 𝐴0
𝑡=1 𝛽

(1)
(2)

In most cases, a region is the same as a state, except for adjusting local
jurisdictions with e-cigarette taxes; accordingly, Illinois and Maryland become five regions
including Chicago, Cook County in Illinois, the rest of Illinois, Montgomery County in
Maryland, and the rest of Maryland.
43
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where β = 1/(1 + r) assuming the rate of interest is equal to the rate of time preference, 𝐶𝑡 and
𝐶𝑡−1 are the quantities of e-cigarettes consumed in period t and period t − 1. Furthermore, 𝑌𝑡 is the
consumption of a composite commodity in period t and is taken as the numeraire, 𝑒𝑡 denotes the
impact of unmeasured life-cycle variables on utility, 𝐶0 measures the initial level of e-cigarette
consumption in period zero, 𝑃𝑡 is the price of e-cigarettes in period t, and 𝐴0 is the present value of
wealth, ignoring any effect of C on earnings or wealth.
This two goods model assumes the utility function is quadratic in 𝑌𝑡 , 𝐶𝑡 , and 𝑒𝑡 . Solving
the first-order conditions for 𝑌𝑡 , and substituting the result into the first-order condition for 𝐶𝑡 ,
BGM gets a first-difference equation, in which the current e-cigarette consumption is a function of
the past and future e-cigarette consumption, the current price of e-cigarettes, and the shift variables
𝑒𝑡 and 𝑒𝑡+1:
(3).

𝐶𝑡 = 𝜃𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝜃𝐶𝑡+1 + 𝜃1 𝑃𝑡 + 𝜃2 𝑒𝑡 + 𝜃3 𝑒𝑡+1

In this equation, 𝜃 measures the effect of changes in past or future consumption on current
consumption depending on the sign of this term. The definition that a good is addictive is when 𝜃 >
0. The larger is 𝜃, the larger is the degree of addiction. See (Becker et al., 1994, pp. 398–399) for
the restrictions on the coefficients. Recognizing that 𝑒𝑡 is serially correlated affecting utility in each
period and consumption at all periods through the optimizing behavior, BGM treat 𝐶𝑡−1 and 𝐶𝑡+1
as endogenous. To resolve the issue of potential inconsistent parameter estimates by OLS
estimations, they use past and future prices as instrument variables (IVs) for 𝐶𝑡−1 and 𝐶𝑡+1 , if the
unobservables are uncorrelated with prices in these periods. Also, BGM includes other exogenous
variables such as income, short and long-distance smuggling indexes, and taxes. Alternatively,
Olekalns and Bardsley (1996) provide a rational addiction model including leads and lags of prices
as independent variables.
For my empirical estimation, I write a variant of (3) for a representative consumer as
follows:
𝐶𝑖,𝑦,𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝜃𝐶𝑖,𝑦,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝜃𝐶𝑖,𝑦,𝑡+1 + 𝜃1 𝑃𝑖,𝑦,𝑡 + 𝛾1 𝑌𝑖,𝑦 + 𝜹𝑿𝑖,𝑦,𝑡 + 𝜎𝑖 + 𝜏𝑦,𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑦,𝑡

(4)

where the subscript 𝑖 denotes the 𝑖th region and the subscript 𝑡 denotes the 𝑡th week in year
𝑦. 𝐶𝑖,𝑦,𝑡 is the log of the total consumption of e-cigarettes (measured as total units of e-cigarettes
purchased) for region 𝑖 at week 𝑡 in year 𝑦. Similarly, 𝐶𝑖,𝑦,𝑡−1 denotes the log of the e-cigarette
consumption in the previous week; and 𝐶𝑖,𝑦,𝑡+1 represents the e-cigarette consumption in the one-

54

period following week. 𝑃𝑖,𝑦,𝑡 is the log of the purchase weighted average weekly retail price of ecigarettes per unit. 𝑌𝑖,𝑦 indicates the per capita income in region 𝑖 and year 𝑦. As in BGM, 𝜃
measures the addictiveness of e-cigarettes; β is the rate of time preference assuming it is equal to
the rate of interest. Positive coefficient estimates for 𝐶𝑖,𝑦,𝑡−1 and 𝐶𝑖,𝑦,𝑡+1 indicate that e-cigarettes
are economically addictive and consumers are forward-looking for e-cigarettes consumption,
respectively.
Furthermore, 𝑿𝑖,𝑦,𝑡 is a matrix of related observable policy covariates. These policies
contain a continuous change in cigarette excise taxes per pack compared to 2009 in region i, year 𝑦,
and week 𝑡; whether a region in a week of a year requires licenses for over-the-counter sales of ecigarettes, restricts sales of e-cigarettes to minors, and has an SFA law that restricts uses of ecigarettes. 𝜹 is a vector of unknown parameters, representing the average mean effects of each of
these policies over time. Moreover, 𝜎𝑖 is region fixed-effects, controlling for unobserved non-time
varying differences in demand across regions, for example, the marginal utility of wealth for a
region in a model with perfect foresight; 𝜏𝑦,𝑡 is year-week or weekly fixed-effects, controlling for
unobserved differences in demand over time that are commonly shared by regions; and 𝜀𝑖,𝑦,𝑡
represents the unobserved time and region varying error term. With these fixed-effects applied in
the model, 𝛾1 reflects forces associated with region-specific changes in the marginal utility of
wealth over time.
This model does not directly estimate the effects of e-cigarette taxes on the current period
of consumption but infers their effects indirectly when these taxes are used as IVs for the lagged
and future consumptions if these consumptions are endogenous. In that case, the results section
further discusses variables, in addition to e-cigarette taxes, used as IVs in regressions. Moreover,
prices, taxes, and income are inflation-adjusted to the level of 2018 December with the monthly
consumer price index (CPI)44 obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Furthermore, this model
does not capture smuggling indexes. This is because, unlike cigarette taxes, current e-cigarette taxes
are newly imposed and have lower rates on average if a region has a tax in place. As a result, ecigarette taxes may not cause sizable “border purchasing effects” or smuggling effects as that of
cigarettes (Becker et al., 1994), or alcohol (Baltagi and Griffin,1995).

44 I apply non-cigarette tobacco CPI for e-cigarette prices and taxes, cigarette CPI
for cigarette excise taxes, and all goods CPI for per capita income.
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Also, following BGM, solving the second-order condition of equation (4) would obtain the
roots of the following quadratic equation:
−𝜃𝜙 2 + 𝜙 − 𝜃𝛽 = 0.

(5)

The two roots are
𝜙1 =

1−(1−4𝜃 2 𝛽)1/2

𝜙2 =

2𝜃

1+(1−4𝜃 2𝛽)1/2
2𝜃

, (6)

with 4𝜃 2 𝛽 < 1 by concavity. Both of these roots are real and positive if and only if ecigarettes are addictive (𝜃 > 0). These estimates can be used to derive derivatives of consumption
changes with respect to e-cigarette price changes (see Appendix A in Becker et al., 1994 for a series
of consumption responses to price changes). As the prices and consumptions in equation (4) are in
log forms, the derivatives obtained represent elasticities in this case.
These elasticity estimates contain short- and long-run demand elasticities for e-cigarettes,
own-price anticipated effects and unanticipated effects, future-price unanticipated effects, as well
as past-price unanticipated effects on the current consumption, 𝐶𝑖,𝑦,𝑡 . The cross-price elasticities
between e-cigarette consumption levels at different spots of time reflects the importance of
addiction to aggregate e-cigarette consumption. In the model, when 𝑃𝑖,𝑦,𝑡 decreases, it will increase
e-cigarette consumption in the current period, 𝐶𝑖,𝑦,𝑡 , and that in the next period, 𝐶𝑖,𝑦,𝑡+1 , if ecigarettes are addictive. If this price decrease is anticipated, the rise in the current period
consumption also stimulates the consumption in the previous period, 𝐶𝑖,𝑦,𝑡−1 . By accumulating
decreases in the current price and future prices, a permanent decrease in e-cigarette price has a
larger effect on current consumption than that does by a temporary fall in price.

3.3

Data
The data of e-cigarette weekly purchase quantities and prices are from the Nielsen Retail

Scanner Data between January 1, 2012, and December 30, 201745, in the U.S. The earliest and
usable46 data for e-cigarette purchases in this dataset begins in 2012. E-cigarette sales include total
e-cigarette starter kits, refill cartridges, and disposables for a variety of outlets such as convenience

The latest data available when I started this article was the 2017 data. Later,
Nielsen has the 2018 data available. Adding additional data from one more year would not
change much of my results, as when I removed the data in 2012 or 2017, results are similar
to that with the data included.
46 Some e-cigarette purchases happened before 2012 are missing because many
states did not sell e-cigarettes then.
45
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stores, drug stores, and mass merchandisers. The total number of regions is 52, including all states
and the District of Columbia, except for Illinois and Maryland; these two states are represented by
five regions: Chicago, Cook County in Illinois, the rest of Illinois, Montgomery County in
Maryland, and the rest of Maryland. Purchases for Alaska, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, and
Hawaii are not available in the Nielsen data set so they are not included in the list of regions. There
are 313 weeks in total. Overall, these regions and weeks constitute 16,276 observations of ecigarette purchases in region-week combinations. Regions do not have gaps in purchases in time.
Aside from the purchase data from Nielsen, the population data for each region in each
year estimated on July 1, in thousands of persons, is from the U.S. Census Bureau. Adjusting
purchases of e-cigarettes with these population data obtain purchases of e-cigarettes by per
thousand of persons. The per capita personal income in a region and a year is from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis. It is total personal income divided by the total midyear population. The policy
data is from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s State Tobacco Activities Tracking
and Evaluation (STATE) System (2020b), the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids (2020a, 2020b),
and Public Health Law Center (2020), government websites, and consultations with designated
officials of state and local jurisdictions.
In the models of this paper, e-cigarette taxes are in dollars per milliliter ($/ml). If a regionweek combination has an e-cigarette tax, the tax variable indicates the dollar amounts per ml;
otherwise, the tax variable is zero. This paper converts the original policy data of e-cigarette taxes
into this measurement by first matching the purchase data with e-cigarette characteristics47 (See
Appendix1 in my first essay, Deng (2020), for details of the conversion). The reason for the
conversion is because the original policy data for e-cigarette taxes are not in the same measurement;
some jurisdictions apply ad valorem taxes by percentages of wholesale or retail prices, other
jurisdictions tax e-cigarettes by specific excise taxes on per ml of the liquid contained in the
product. For example, Minnesota taxed e-cigarettes at 95% of the wholesale price in 2013 March
and after; North Carolina imposed an e-cigarette tax at $0.050 per ml of the liquid in 2015 October
and after. Aside from e-cigarette taxes, changes in cigarette excise taxes are dollars per pack
compared to 2009 with zeroes indicate no tax changes; for other policies, if a region-week
combination has a particular policy in place, the corresponding policy variable equals to one,
otherwise, it equals to zero. Additionally, prices, income, and taxes are all inflation-adjusted by

These e-cigarette characteristics are from Cotti et al., (2018) and Cotti et al.,
(2020). These authors are acknowledged for their generosities of sharing the data.
47
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CPI to the level of 2017 December. Table 3.1 shows a descriptive analysis of the variables in this
paper.

3.4

Results
I start my estimation strategy with a myopic addiction model then continue with a forward-

looking model in Table 3.2. With these results as a foundation, I test a rational addiction model in
Table 3.3. Table 2 shows the results of myopic addiction behaviors and forward-looking behaviors
separately. An addiction model predicts that the previous consumption reinforcing the current
consumption. If the goods were addictive, the coefficient of previous consumption would be
positive. Since the previous price (𝑃𝑖,𝑦,𝑡−1 ) is a strong predictor of the previous consumption
(𝐶𝑖,𝑦,𝑡−1 ), using an OLS estimation, column (1) provides some evidence that e-cigarettes are
economically addictive as the coefficient for 𝑃𝑖,𝑦,𝑡−1 is negative. Similarly, incorporating the
previous consumption directly without the previous-period price, I have found the coefficient of
𝐶𝑖,𝑦,𝑡−1 is positive (not shown in table). However, as the model indicates, OLS estimates with the
past consumption incorporated directly are inconsistent as 𝐶𝑖,𝑦,𝑡−1 depends on 𝑒𝑖,𝑦,𝑡 through the
optimizing behavior implied in the first-order conditions. To resolve the endogenous variable
problem for past consumption, following the literature, I obtain 2SLS estimates of myopic models
of addiction.
In column (2), past price and other explanatory variables in equation (4) consist of the
instruments for past consumption. On top of column (2), column (3) adds the one-period lag values
of the e-cigarette tax to the instruments; column (4) further adds the current period e-cigarette tax;
on top of all these, column (4) further adds the two-period lagged price and the corresponding tax
to the instrument list. According to the parameter estimates of the myopic model in Table 3.2,
current price negatively relates to current e-cigarette consumption but income positively relates to
that. The positive and statistically significant estimates for past consumption indicate that ecigarette using is addictive. Except for restrictions of sales to minors get a negative coefficient, all
policies get positive coefficient estimates (hold for all estimations in tables).
The forward-looking specifications suppose consumers take into account the amount that
they would consume in the future for their current levels of e-cigarette consumption. Similar to past
consumption, future consumption would be endogenous if incorporated directly into the model for
current consumption because 𝐶𝑖,𝑦,𝑡 depends on 𝑒𝑖,𝑦,𝑡+1 through the optimizing behavior. The
results of such a regression with OLS estimation indicates that consumers are forward-looking for
e-cigarettes consumption (results not shown in table). In a similar fashion as the myopic model,
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column (6) shows that future price negatively influences current consumption, again suggesting
that consumers are forward-looking. Columns (7) – (10) use different sets of instruments for future
consumption. In column (7), future price and other explanatory variables in equation (4) work as
the instruments for future consumption. On top of column (7), column (8) adds the one-period lead
values of the e-cigarette tax to the instruments; column (9) further adds the current period ecigarette tax; on top of all these, column (10) further adds the two-period lagged price and the
corresponding tax to the instrument list. All of these specifications show that consumers are
forward-looking as the coefficient estimates for the future consumption are all positive and
statistically significant.
What separates a myopic addiction model from a rational addiction model is that the
rational addiction model supposes that consumers are both addictive and forward-looking for ecigarette consumption, while the myopic addiction model implies that consumers would not take
the future amount of consumption into account at the current period consumption. Thus, if the data
supports the myopic addiction model, the coefficient of the lagged consumption would be positive
and statistically significant and the coefficient of the lead consumption or price would not be
statistically significant. In contrast, the rational addiction model predicts the coefficient of the lead
consumption would be positive and statistically significant. The OLS estimates in column (1) of
Table 3.3 shows evidence of rational addiction.
To resolve the inconsistency problem as in Table 3.2, I use IVs for the endogenous lagged
and lead consumptions in the 2SLS specifications. In Table 3.3, the instruments in column (2)
consist of the one-period lag and lead of prices respectively for the corresponding consumption and
other explanatory variables in the model. On top of column (2), column (3) adds the one-period lag
and lead of taxes to the corresponding consumption. With these IVs included, column (4) further
adds the current period tax as an IV; column (5) additionally adds the two-period lagged price and
tax to the instrument list. All of these specifications are consistent with the hypothesis that
consumers are rationally addicted to e-cigarettes as the coefficient estimates for the future and past
consumptions are both positive and statistically significant. In these specifications, containing taxes
as IVs is because consumers may have more information about taxes than prices. The inclusion of
both taxes and prices as IVs allows for the possibility that consumers have information about the
tax-exclusive price.
Based on corresponding columns in Table 3.3, Table 3.4 shows additional parameter
estimates and elasticities of e-cigarette consumption in response to various price changes at the
sample means of price and consumption. Consistent with the predictions of the rational model, the

59

estimates of the discount factor 𝛽 are positive and the two roots of equation (6) are positive.
Unanticipated price change assumes that the price change is not anticipated until the corresponding
period. In the 2SLS estimations, a 10-percent temporary increase in the current price of e-cigarettes
would decrease current consumption by 6.9-8.8 percent if the price change is anticipated; in
contrast, it would decrease current consumption by 6.1-8.5 percent if it is unanticipated (see rows
for own price anticipated and unanticipated in Table 3.4). As to cross-price effects, a 10-percent
unanticipated increase in current price leads to a 2.3-2.6 percent decrease in the previous period’s
consumption (see the row for future price unanticipated) and to a 1.2-1.8 percent decrease in the
next period’s consumption (see the row for past price unanticipated).
Moreover, the long-run response of a permanent price change of 10 percent leads to a 13.614.9 percent decrease in demand. A 10-percent price increase causes a 10.5-11.8 percent decrease
in e-cigarette consumption in the short-run. The estimates of the long-run price elasticity are 1.21.4 times of those for the short-run. All these elasticity estimates provide evidence that e-cigarettes
are addictive and rational: past and future price changes have statistically significant influences on
current consumption. However, the estimates for the discount factor in these specifications
correspond to negative interest rates ranging between -0.323 to -0.513. Additionally, the OLS
estimation provides support for rational addiction though the coefficient estimates could be
inconsistent. Column (1) in Table 3.4 indicates that the long-run price elasticity in the OLS model
is -3.304 and the short-run elasticity is -1.007. The estimates for the discount factor is 1.072,
corresponding to an interest rate of -0.040.
Therefore, OLS and 2SLS estimations all provide evidence that consumers are rationally
addicted to e-cigarettes; however, these estimations do not provide reliable estimates for the
discount factor. Follow BGM, Table 3.5 imposes the discount factor a priori, ranging from 0.70 to
0.95 (interest rates ranging from 5.3 percent to 42.9 percent). This means that I constrain the
coefficient for future consumption to equal to the imposed discount factor multiplied by the
estimated coefficient of past consumption. Model specifications in Table 3.5 are similar to those of
columns (2) and (3) in Table 3.3 except for separating the year-week fixed-effects into year fixedeffects, month fixed-effects, and week fixed-effects. The unrestricted estimates for price
coefficients, past-consumption coefficients, long-run price elasticities, and short-run elasticities are
very close to those of Table 3.3 and Table 3.4. Therefore, the results of Table 5 are comparable to
those of the two tables.
Estimates of Table 3.5 indicate that regardless of the restrictions of the discount factor,
estimates of the long-run and short-run price elasticities are very similar to each other. Further
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comparing these estimates in Table 3.3, column (4) is my preferred specification, which reaches a
long-run price elasticity of about -1.50 and the short-run price elasticity of -1.05, as taxes seem to
be important predictors for consumptions. The main difference between the OLS and 2SLS
estimates is that OLS reaches -3.30 for the long-run price elasticity estimate and -1.01 for the shortrun estimate.
The results in Tables 3.3 and 5 do not pin down the discount factor with precision. This
problem is similar to other studies of aggregate consumption, the consumption of specific goods,
or the consumption of leisure over time. Some of these studies reach very high-interest rates while
others obtain low or negative interest rates as mine (Bover, O., 1991; Epstein and Zin, 1991; Hansen
and Singleton, 1983; Hotz et al., 1988; Mankiw et al., 1985). Overall, my model estimates are not
sensitive to the choice of discount factors. The long-run and short-run price elasticity estimates
reached from different sets of instruments are similar to each other.

3.5

Conclusions
I first investigate the addictive behaviors and forward-looking behaviors and find

corresponding evidence for these behaviors. Then I test a rational addiction model inspired by
BGM. Results provide evidence that e-cigarettes are rationally addictive rather than myopically
addictive. With the rational addiction model, my estimates for the long-run price elasticity is about
-1.50 and for the short-run price elasticity is -1.05. These results indicate that e-cigarettes are price
elastic. Using the same data source and analysis methods, I have conducted similar regressions for
the consumption of cigarettes as a comparison for e-cigarettes (not shown in tables, available upon
request). Results indicate that e-cigarettes are generally less addictive than cigarettes because the
estimate of addictiveness measurement, coefficient for past consumption, for e-cigarettes (0.26) is
smaller than that for cigarettes (0.49).
Furthermore, the estimate of short-run price elasticity of cigarette consumption is -0.48
while the estimate for e-cigarettes is very close to one (-1.05). This comparison shows that raising
taxes on e-cigarettes, if the taxes influence consumption by increasing price, may not generate as
many revenues as cigarette taxes in the short-run; however, e-cigarette tax could be a more effective
temporary tool for tobacco control of e-cigarettes as the demand of the product is elastic. For both
products, the long-run tax effects would be stronger than the short-run effects. Additionally,
potential assumption violations could affect the results. These assumptions include consumers’
time-consistent preferences and complete information for decision-making. Relaxing these
assumptions and using micro-panel data could be potential research directions in the future.
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Table 3.1 Descriptive Analysis
Variables

N= 16,276

Purchase Variables and Income

Mean

Std. Dev.

E-Cigarette Price ($/unit)
Number of E-Cigarette Purchase (units)
E-Cigarette Purchases by Per Thousand of Population (units)
Yearly Region Level Per Capita Personal Income ($)

6.008
6,447.228
1.204
49,424.880

1.217
6,745.038
0.781
8,516.305

E-Cigarette Taxes ($/ml)

0.126

0.611

Changes in Cigarette Excise Taxes ($/pack)
Retail Licensure on E-Cigarettes (Yes)

0.317
0.144

0.612
0.351

Policy Variables

E-Cigarette Restrictions on Sales to Minors (Yes)
0.579
0.494
E-Cigarette SFA Laws (Yes)
0.081
0.273
Source: Author’s calculations for data from the Nielsen Retail Scanner Data, the CDC STATE
System, state government websites, and others. Note: Timespan is 2012 through 2017. Changes in
cigarette taxes are compared to 2009; E-cigarette price, income, and all taxes are inflation-adjusted
by CPI to the level of 2017 December.
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Table 3.2 Estimates of E-Cigarette Myopic Addiction and Forward-Looking Behaviors
Dependent Variable: 𝑪𝒊,𝒚,𝒕
Myopic Addiction
Variables
(1) OLS
(2) 2SLS
(3) 2SLS
(4) 2FSLS
(5) 2SLS
0.285***
0.372***
0.484***
0.557***
𝐶𝑖,𝑦,𝑡−1
(0.044)
(0.038)
(0.032)
(0.027)
-1.044***
-0.941***
-0.839***
-0.708***
-0.621***
𝑃𝑖,𝑦,𝑡
(0.057)
(0.058)
(0.049)
(0.042)
(0.036)
0.492***
0.359***
0.326***
0.283***
0.255***
𝑌𝑖,𝑦
(0.127)
(0.095)
(0.085)
(0.074)
(0.067)
-0.278***
𝑃𝑖,𝑦,𝑡−1
(0.056)
R-Squared
0.964
Centered R2
0.582
0.663
0.748
0.793
Uncentered R2
0.582
0.663
0.748
0.793
N
16,276
16,276
16,276
16,276
16,276
Forward-Looking
Variables
OLS
2SLS
2SLS
2SLS
2SLS
0.347***
0.436***
0.518***
0.589***
𝐶𝑖,𝑦,𝑡+1
(0.039)
(0.033)
(0.029)
(0.025)
-0.978***
-0.880***
-0.778***
-0.685***
-0.604***
𝑃𝑖,𝑦,𝑡
(0.058)
(0.051)
(0.043)
(0.037)
(0.033)
0.488***
0.309***
0.273***
0.240***
0.211***
𝑌𝑖,𝑦
(0.127)
(0.088)
(0.078)
(0.070)
(0.064)
-0.360***
𝑃𝑖,𝑦,𝑡+1
(0.057)
R-Squared
0.964
Centered R2
0.643
0.717
0.773
0.813
Uncentered R2
0.643
0.717
0.773
0.813
N
16,224
16,224
16,224
16,224
16,224
Note: Model (2) includes a lagged price 𝑃𝑖,𝑦,𝑡−1 and policy variables as IVs for lagged consumption.
In addition to the lagged price, model (3) adds a one-period lagged tax as IVs. On top of model (3),
model (4) further adds the current tax as IVs; model (5) further adds a two-period lagged tax and
price as IVs on top of the model (4). Models (6)-(10) are similar to models (2)-(5) for IVs, with a
one-period lead price 𝑃𝑖,𝑦,𝑡+1 replace the one-period lagged price and a one-period lead tax replace
the one-period lagged tax, and keeping the two-period lagged taxes and prices as IVs in the model
(10). All regressions include region fixed-effects (FE), weekly dummies (year-week FE), yearly per
capita income for each state, and policy variables. Variables for consumption, price, and income
are in log form. Prices, taxes, and income are inflation-adjusted with CPI to the level of 2017
December. Robust standard errors are in the parentheses. *significant at the 0.1 level, ** significant
at the 0.05 level, *** significant at the 0.01 level.
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Table 3.3 Estimates of E-Cigarette Rational Addiction: Dependent Variable = 𝑪𝒊,𝒚,𝒕
Variables
(1) OLS
(2) 2SLS
(3) 2SLS
(4) 2SLS
(5) 2SLS
0.462***
0.130**
0.237***
0.259***
0.257***
𝐶𝑖,𝑦,𝑡−1
(0.013)
(0.057)
(0.046)
(0.042)
(0.041)
0.482***
0.267***
0.299***
0.371***
0.380***
𝐶𝑖,𝑦,𝑡+1
(0.013)
(0.055)
(0.046)
(0.041)
(0.040)
-0.184***
-0.819***
-0.656***
-0.549***
-0.542***
𝑃𝑖,𝑦,𝑡
(0.013)
(0.051)
(0.038)
(0.032)
(0.031)
0.087***
0.295***
0.242***
0.206***
0.203***
𝑌𝑖,𝑦
(0.044)
(0.082)
(0.067)
(0.058)
(0.058)
R-Squared
0.996
Centered R2
0.689
0.792
0.843
0.846
Uncentered R2
0.689
0.792
0.843
0.846
N
16,224
16,224
16,224
16,224
16,224
Note: Model (2) includes a lagged price Pi,y,t−1 , a lead price Pi,y,t+1 , and policy variables as IVs
for the lagged and the lead consumption. In addition to the lagged and lead prices, model (3) adds
a one-period lagged tax and a lead tax as IVs. On top of model (3), model (4) further adds the
current tax as IVs; model (5) further adds a two-period lagged taxes and prices as IVs on top of the
model (4). All regressions include region fixed-effects (FE), weekly dummies (year-week FE),
yearly per capita income for each state, and policy variables. Variables for consumption, price, and
income are in log form. Prices, taxes, and income are inflation-adjusted with CPI to the level of
2017 December. Robust standard errors are in the parentheses. *significant at the 0.1 level, **
significant at the 0.05 level, *** significant at the 0.01 level.
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Table 3.4 Parameters and Elasticities Based on Model Results of Rational Addiction
Variables
(1) OLS
(2) 2SLS
(3) 2SLS
(4) 2SLS
(5) 2SLS
1.042***
2.052
1.261***
1.431***
1.477***
𝛽
(0.058)
(1.247)
(0.418)
(0.371)
(0.380)
Φ1
0.725***
0.277***
0.324***
0.416***
0.426***
(0.021)
(0.056)
(0.050)
(0.044)
(0.044)
Φ2
1.438***
7.420**
3.889***
3.443***
3.465***
(0.046)
(3.322)
(0.784)
(0.587)
(0.594)
Own Price:
Anticipated
-0.559***
-0.883***
-0.776***
-0.700***
-0.694***
(0.031)
(0.042)
(0.031)
(0.027)
(0.027)
Unanticipated
-0.277***
-0.850***
-0.711***
-0.615***
-0.608***
(0.018)
(0.046)
(0.035)
(0.030)
(0.029)
Future Price:
Unanticipated
-0.201***
-0.235***
-0.230***
-0.256***
-0.259***
(0.013)
(0.043)
(0.033)
(0.025)
(0.025)
Past Price:
Unanticipated
-0.193***
-0.115**
-0.183***
-0.179***
-0.176***
(0.013)
(0.050)
(0.035)
(0.030)
(0.029)
-3.304***
-1.358***
-1.416***
-1.484***
-1.490***
LR-𝜀
(0.196)
(0.035)
(0.039)
(0.044)
(0.044)
-1.007***
-1.175***
-1.052***
-1.053***
-1.060***
SR-𝜀
(0.090)
(0.086)
(0.077)
(0.077)
(0.077)
1.156
1.346
1.409
1.406
Ratio of LR-𝜀 to 3.068
SR-𝜀
Notes: The standard errors for the parameters are approximate standard errors in parentheses. LR𝜀 represents long-run elasticity; SR-𝜀 means short-run elasticity. Almost all the coefficients are
statistically different from zero. *significant at the 0.1 level, ** significant at the 0.05 level, ***
significant at the 0.01 level.
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Table 3.5 Estimates of E-Cigarette Rational Addiction in Restricted Models
Dependent Variable = 𝑪𝒊,𝒚,𝒕
Model
𝑃𝑖,𝑦,𝑡
𝐶𝑖,𝑦,𝑡−1
LR-𝜀
𝛽
0.70
(2)
-0.801
0.215
-1.261
(3)
-0.668
0.288
-1.307

SR-𝜀
-0.981
-0.906

0.75

(2)
(3)

-0.800
-0.667

0.209
0.280

-1.262
-1.308

-0.989
-0.917

0.80

(2)
(3)

-0.800
-0.667

0.204
0.272

-1.263
-1.308

-0.996
-0.928

0.85

(2)
(3)

-0.799
-0.666

0.199
0.265

-1.263
-1.309

-1.003
-0.938

0.90

(2)
(3)

-0.798
-0.666

0.194
0.259

-1.264
-1.310

-1.010
-0.948

0.95

(2)
(3)

-0.798
-0.666

0.189
0.252

-1.264
-1.310

-1.017
-0.957

Not Restricted

(2)
-0.801
0.119
-1.268
-1.113
(3)
-0.667
0.218
-1.313
-1.007
Notes: Restricted models are similar to models (2) and (3) in Table 3 but with restrictions on 𝛽.
Model (2) includes a lagged price Pi,y,t−1 , a lead price Pi,y,t+1, and policies as IVs for the lagged
and the lead consumption. On top of the model (2), model (3) adds a lagged tax and a lead tax as
IVs. All regressions include region fixed-effects (FE), time FE (year, month, and week), and policy
variables. If not restricted, 𝛽 is greater than one in models (2) and (3).
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1 TWO METHODS FOR CONVERTING E-CIGARETTE TAXES
TO DOLLARS PER MILLILITER
Jurisdictions tax e-cigarettes mainly in two ways: ad valorem taxes, based on the wholesale or retail
price, or specific excise taxes, according to the volume of the liquid contained. These taxes are
levied on wholesalers or retailers. I call the ad valorem taxes price tax (P.Tax) and use the
volumetric tax (V.Tax) to refer to specific excise taxes. By the end of 2017, Minnesota, the District
of Columbia, California, and Montgomery County in Maryland tax e-cigarettes by percentages of
the wholesale price; Pennsylvania taxes e-cigarettes by percentages of the retail price. In contrast,
North Carolina, Louisiana, West Virginia, Kansas, and Cook County in Illinois tax e-cigarettes per
fluid milliliter (ml) of the liquid. The city of Chicago in Illinois uses V.Tax not only via taxing per
fluid ml of the liquid but also adds taxes per unit of e-cigarettes. To compare taxes in these regions,
it is necessary to measure all taxes in the same unit. Thus, I convert P.Tax and the V.Tax in Chicago
to the dollar amounts per ml. I reach very similar results when using the following two, completely
different ways to convert the P.Tax.
(a) E-Cigarette Tax Conversion Based on Wholesale Price Calculations
The first method conducts the conversion by calculating the wholesale price. It uses retail prices in
a region to compute wholesale prices based on guidelines of cigarette minimum price laws.
According to the guidelines of Publication 509 from the Department of Taxation and Finance in
New York State (2020), the retail price of cigarettes is at least 7% higher than the agent-to-retaildealers minimum selling price. I assume the pricing mechanisms are the same for e-cigarettes, i.e.
the price raising rates are the same from manufacturers, to wholesale dealers, to retail dealers, then
to consumers. Thus, I have three steps. First, I divide the average retail price of e-cigarettes per ml
for region 𝑖 in week 𝑡 by 1.07, giving the post-tax wholesale price. Second, dividing this price
with (1 + 𝑎𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑚 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 ); I get the pre-tax wholesale price. Third, multiplying the pre-tax
wholesale price with the tax rate for the current region-week observation, I get the e-cigarette tax
per ml in this region-week combination.
Specifically, the formula is:
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑃𝑖𝑡
/(1 + 𝑎𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑚 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 )
1.07
The formula for calculating the average retail price of e-cigarettes per ml is:
𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑚𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑚 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 ∗

𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 /𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡
(b) E-Cigarette Tax Conversion Based on DC Taxes
The second method also has three steps for conversion. In the first step, it uses the District of
Columbia’s (DC’s) tax to compute the dollar amounts for each percentage point of P.Tax, since the
e-cigarette tax rate in DC matches 100% of the traditional cigarette excise tax at the state level. In
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the second step, I reach the total tax revenues for this region-week combination by multiplying the
total percentage points of the ad valorem taxes by the value of each percentage point (PPV) from
the first step and the total sales quantities in units for region 𝑖 in week 𝑡. In the third step, dividing
the tax revenues by the total sales quantities in ml gets the tax rate per ml. Since e-cigarette taxes
in DC vary each year due to yearly changes in cigarette excise taxes, I reach different PPV each
year. Generally, the value increases by about $0.002 each year. For example, values in 2015 and
2016 were $0.043 and $0.045 respectively. I adjust the PPV each year and use these values in my
calculations to be accurate.
Specifically, the formula for this conversion is:
𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑚𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑚 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡
∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 /𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑙𝑖𝑡
(c) E-Cigarette Tax in the City of Chicago, Illinois
Chicago initially taxed e-cigarettes at $0.80 per unit plus $0.55 per ml. Cook County, to which
Chicago belongs, implements an e-cigarette tax of $0.20 per ml, therefore making the total tax rate
per ml $0.75 in Chicago later. For taxes in Chicago, I use the following formula:
𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑚𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 0.80 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝑡𝑎𝑥_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑙𝑖𝑡
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APPENDIX 2 ECIGARETTE TAXES AND THEIR EFFECTS ON SALES OF ECIGARETTES: INDIVIDUAL CASES
Table A2.a Regions in the US with E-Cigarette Taxes Effective by December 30, 2017
Location
Tax Rate
Effective Date Tax in 2017 Dec
Price Tax (P.Tax)
70% of the wholesale price
03/2010
Minnesota
95% of the wholesale price
07/2013
$5.358/ml
District of Columbia
67% of the wholesale price
10/2015
65% of the wholesale price
10/2016
60% of the wholesale price
10/2017
$5.825/ml
Pennsylvania
40% of the retail price
10/2016
$4.498/ml
California
27.30% of the wholesale price
04/2017
65.08% of the wholesale price
07/2017
$10.082/ml
Montgomery County,
Maryland
30% of the wholesale price
08/2015
$2.454/ml
Specific Volumetric Tax (V.Tax)
Chicago City, Illinois $0.80/unit plus $0.55/ml
01/2016
$2.088/ml
Cook County, Illinois $0.20 per fluid ml of the liquid
05/2016
$0.200/ml
North Carolina
$0.05 per fluid ml of the liquid
06/2015
$0.050/ml
Louisiana
$0.05 per fluid ml of the liquid
08/2015
$0.050/ml
West Virginia
$0.075 per fluid ml of the liquid
07/2016
$0.075/ml
Kansas
$0.05 per fluid ml of the liquid
07/2017
$0.050/ml
Note: Taxes for Puerto Rico, US Virgin Islands, and localities in Alaska are not included. Tax
levels in December of 2017 for each region are inflation-adjusted with CPI to the level of 2017
December. These tax levels are converted from wholesale price calculations.
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Figure A2.a Effects of EET on Sales Quantities and Prices of E-Cigarettes: Individual Cases
(CA)
Note: CT means treated counterfactuals. ATT represents the average treatment effect on the
treated unit. The top panel shows figures of LogQ(unit). The bottom panel shows figures of
LogP(unit).
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Figure A2.b Effects of EET on Sales Quantities and Prices of E-Cigarettes: Individual Cases
(DC)
Note: CT means treated counterfactuals. ATT represents the average treatment effect on the
treated unit. The top panel shows figures of LogQ(unit). The bottom panel shows figures of
LogP(unit).
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Figure A2.c Effects of EET on Sales Quantities and Prices of E-Cigarettes: Individual Cases
(M1: Montgomery County, MD)
Note: CT means treated counterfactuals. ATT represents the average treatment effect on the
treated unit. The top panel shows figures of LogQ(unit). The bottom panel shows figures of
LogP(unit).
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Figure A2.d Effects of EET on Sales Quantities and Prices of E-Cigarettes: Individual Cases
(MN)
Note: CT means treated counterfactuals. ATT represents the average treatment effect on the
treated unit. The top panel shows figures of LogQ(unit). The bottom panel shows figures of
LogP(unit).
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Figure A2.e Effects of EET on Sales Quantities and Prices of E-Cigarettes: Individual Cases
(PA)
Note: CT means treated counterfactuals. ATT represents the average treatment effect on the
treated unit. The top panel shows figures of LogQ(unit). The bottom panel shows figures of
LogP(unit).
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Figure A2.f Effects of EET on Sales Quantities and Prices of E-Cigarettes: Individual Cases
(C1: Chicago City, IL)
Note: CT means treated counterfactuals. ATT represents the average treatment effect on the
treated unit. The top panel shows figures of LogQ(unit). The bottom panel shows figures of
LogP(unit).
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Figure A2.g Effects of EET on Sales Quantities and Prices of E-Cigarettes: Individual Cases
(C2: Cook County, IL [Exclude Chicago City])
Note: CT means treated counterfactuals. ATT represents the average treatment effect on the
treated unit. The top panel shows figures of LogQ(unit). The bottom panel shows figures of
LogP(unit).
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Figure A2.h Effects of EET on Sales Quantities and Prices of E-Cigarettes: Individual Cases
(KS)
Note: CT means treated counterfactuals. ATT represents the average treatment effect on the
treated unit. The top panel shows figures of LogQ(unit). The bottom panel shows figures of
LogP(unit).
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Figure A2.i Effects of EET on Sales Quantities and Prices of E-Cigarettes: Individual Cases
(LA)
Note: CT means treated counterfactuals. ATT represents the average treatment effect on the
treated unit. The top panel shows figures of LogQ(unit). The bottom panel shows figures of
LogP(unit).
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Figure A2.j Effects of EET on Sales Quantities and Prices of E-Cigarettes: Individual Cases
(NC)
Note: CT means treated counterfactuals. ATT represents the average treatment effect on the
treated unit. The top panel shows figures of LogQ(unit). The bottom panel shows figures of
LogP(unit).
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Figure A2.k Effects of EET on Sales Quantities and Prices of E-Cigarettes: Individual Cases
(WV)
Note: CT means treated counterfactuals. ATT represents the average treatment effect on the
treated unit. The top panel shows figures of LogQ(unit). The bottom panel shows figures of
LogP(unit).
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